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The present dissertation uncovers the processes by which self-other overlap influences prosocial 
behavior and its consequences across different close relationships. Chapter I reviews extant 
theory and research on self-other overlap and its role in relationships and prosocial behavior. 
Chapter II explores whether discrete emotions shift perceptions of self-other overlap, and how 
shifts influence downstream prosocial tendencies across 4 studies. Study 1 found that reflecting 
on an angry experience with a close friend led to less self-other overlap and subsequent prosocial 
tendencies toward that friend, relative to reflecting on a happy or more neutral experience. 
Furthermore, anger undermined helping through the mediating role of self-other overlap, relative 
to the other conditions.  Study 2 ruled out a general negative valence explanation after finding no 
significant self-other overlap differences from reflecting on emotions similar in valence (i.e., sad, 
content, or control) involving a close friend. Study 3 tested emotions that directly implicate 
others (i.e., gratitude, anger, and control) among best friends. Anger undermined self-other 
overlap, relative to the control. However, there were no self-other overlap differences between 
gratitude and control, condition effects on helping, or mediation. Study 4 found null effects of 
anger on self-other overlap, relative to gratitude and control, suggesting that marital relationships 
may be one boundary condition. Chapter III explores whether relationship type, a proxy for self-
other overlap, moderates the long-term health outcomes of providing support to close others. 
Giving to emotionally close partners predicted mortality risk, when giving to children. This 





stress-regulation. Study 5a found that providing support to adult children predicted reduced 
mortality risk 17 years later among older adult parents, but providing support to other partners 
(e.g., parents, siblings, other relatives, friends) did not predict mortality risk among either parents 
(Study 5a) or non-parents (Study 5b), controlling for a number of plausible confounds. Chapter 
IV concludes by discussing the implications of the research for a variety of research literatures 
and future directions. Together, the studies begin to illuminate the intricacies by which self-other 












One of the most fundamental distinctions in social psychology is the one between self 
and other.  Theoretical exploration of these two spheres of human existence are supported by an 
extensive literature (for review, see Wiggins, 1991). For example, Bakan (1966) differentiated 
agency (the individuated self that strives for mastery, power, and self-protection) from 
communion (the connected self that strives for intimacy, union, and solidarity). These two 
modalities can be mapped onto an interpersonal circumplex that organizes interpersonal behavior 
(Wiggins, 1991). Parallel distinctions occur in Fromm’s (1941) separate entity versus oneness 
with world, Erikson’s (1950) autonomy versus basic trust, McAdams’s (1985) power vs intimacy 
motivation, and more recently, Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) independent versus 
interdependent self.  Major areas of psychological research have incorporated distinctions 
between the self and other into their theorizing, such as research on self and identity (W. B. 
Swann & Bosson, 2010), close relationships (Clark & Lemay, 2010), prosocial behavior (Penner, 
Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005), and aggression (Bushman & Huesmann, 2010).  Over the 
last two decades theoretical interest has focused on how the self may be merged or overlap with 
others and how this self-other overlap influences different intrapersonal and interpersonal 
outcomes (Aron & Aron, 1996, 1997; Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, et al., 2004; Aron, Aron, Tudor, 
& Nelson, 1991; Batson, 1987, 1991, 1997; Batson et al., 1997; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & 





Hodges, 2012; Neuberg et al., 1997). Furthermore, social psychological theory and research 
suggest that self-other overlap has important implications for prosocial behavior in close and 
non-close relationships (Cialdini et al., 1997; Maner et al., 2002; Neuberg et al., 1997).  
In this dissertation, I extend the current literature on psychological self-other overlap by 
exploring its relationship to prosocial behavior in close relationships within two contexts. First, 
previous theoretical and empirical work in social psychology suggests that self-other overlap has 
important implications for prosocial behavior. However, several important questions remain 
unanswered. The present work seeks to contribute to this literature by exploring how factors 
within close relationships (in this case, different interpersonal emotions) may influence the 
tendency to psychologically include others into the self and how shifts in self-other overlap from 
these interpersonal emotions impact prosocial tendencies directed toward that close other.  
Second, the present research explores how self-other overlap moderates the health 
benefits of prosocial behavior over time. Research suggests that people are more willing to help 
emotionally closer others than non-close others (Cialdini et al., 1997), suggesting that they are 
more willing to help others who are perceived as sharing greater self-other overlap. Furthermore, 
giving to others has been associated with mental and physical health benefits for the self (for 
review, see Konrath & Brown, 2013).  However, little is known about how self-other overlap 
moderates the health benefits of prosocial behavior over time for givers. Thus, the present 
research addresses this gap in the literature by exploring whether giving to different relationship 
partners (presumably, with varying levels of emotional closeness) affects the association between 





Across 5 studies, the present research hopes to integrate theory and research from a 
variety of research literatures to examine the role of self-other overlap in prosocial behavior and 
close relationships.  
What is the Self?  
 Psychology’s search for the nature of selfhood has been an ongoing preoccupation in the 
field. Countless reviews attempt to organize the existing large body of research on the self with 
its various theories, definitions, and levels of analysis (Baumeister, 1998; Leary & Tangney, 
2003; Mischel & Morf, 2003; Oyserman, 2004; W. B. J. Swann, Chang-Schneider, & Larsen 
McClarty, 2007; Tice & Baumeister, 2001).  The self could be generally organized as a reflexive 
consciousness that is fundamentally interpersonal and capable of agency (Baumeister, 1998). Of 
particular interest to the present research is the self’s reflexive sense of “me” within an 
inherently social world, and how that awareness can affect the choices people make within 
important social relationships. A person’s sense of “me,” or self-concept, encompasses the 
attributes, attitudes, beliefs, roles, scripts, prototypes, physical appearance, and material 
belongings that the individual thinks define who that individual is (e.g., James, 1890). In essence, 
an individual’s self-concept answers the question, “Who am I?” As a fundamentally social being, 
the self does not exist in a void, and as such the self-concept is a dynamic reflection of the social 
world (e.g., Baumeister, 1998) and people’s relationships in this social world (e.g., Aron & Aron, 
1997; H. Markus & Wurf, 1987). Cues from the social environment and the relationships to the 
self can shift an individual’s self-concept and the choices people make in social relationships. 
Furthermore, how the self behaves within people’s social environment could potentially 





present research examines one important construct of the self situated within a social world: self-
other overlap. 
What is Self-other Overlap? 
In social psychology, research suggests that people sometimes psychologically include 
others into the self (Aron & Aron, 1986; Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, et al., 2004; Aron, Aron, & 
Smollan, 1992; Cialdini et al., 1997; Myers & Hodges, 2012) in a process known as self-other 
overlap. Self-other overlap is a psychological construct that may be more or less directly 
accessible to respondents (Myers & Hodges, 2012). As representative of a psychological 
construct, self-other overlap can form with any partner, regardless of kinship, varies across social 
contexts and partners, and may be easily malleable depending on input from the social 
environment.  
Multiple converging research literatures have contributed to the conceptualization of self-
other overlap over time. Not only does this research literature use different terms somewhat 
interchangeably such as inclusion of others in the self, oneness, or self-other merging, it also uses 
different measures to reach its conclusions. Theorizing on self-other overlap originated from 
research by Aron and colleagues that explored self-other overlap in close relationships (Aron et 
al., 1991; Aron & Aron, 1996, 1997; Mashek, Aron, & Boncimino, 2003). They argued that self-
other overlap, or including others in the self, emerges from people’s motivation to form and 
maintain close relationships. This motivation manifests as the expansion of the sense of self to 
include close others’ resources, perspectives, and traits as a means to increase their own self-
efficacy, intrinsic motivation, and self-actualization. Similarly, self-other overlap has also been 
described as oneness or “shared or interconnected identities with others” (Cialdini et al., 1997, p. 





argued that taking the perspective of another person who is suffering produces feelings of 
empathic concern for that person and thus an altruistic motivation to improve that person’s 
welfare (Batson, 1987, 1991, 1991, 1997; Batson et al., 1997). Countering this argument, 
Cialdini and colleagues argued that perspective-taking increases helping through more egoistic 
motivation because the helper feels more “at one with” than empathic concern toward the 
suffering other (Cialdini et al., 1997, p. 483; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007; Neuberg et al., 1997).  
Lastly, self-other overlap has also been referred to as a merging of self and other defined as a 
cognitive phenomenon that occurs during perspective taking in which an increased overlap in 
mental representations between the self and other person occurs (Davis et al., 1996).  
Bringing more clarity to the field, a factor analysis of popular measures of self-other 
overlap across the multiple literatures suggests that self-other overlap is a multidimensional 
construct comprising of two primary factors: a) perceived closeness and b) overlapping mental 
representations (Myers & Hodges, 2012).  Perceived closeness “consist[s] of direct and 
conscious perceptions of closeness with the other person” (Myers & Hodges, 2012, p. 665) and 
this factor maps closely with Aron and colleagues’ concept of inclusion of others in the self in 
the close relationship literature (Aron et al., 1992; Aron & Aron, 1986) and Cialdini’s concept of 
oneness in the empathy-altruism literature (Cialdini et al., 1997). Perceived closeness has been 
experimentally manipulated by having participants reflect on particular individuals of varying 
closeness (i.e., a near stranger, an acquaintance, a good friend, or a close family member 
(Cialdini et al., 1997), or by having strangers complete a self-disclosure and relationship-
building task in the lab (Aron, Melinat, Aron, Vallone, & Bator, 1997). Closeness is typically 
measured by the Inclusion of Others in the Self Scale (IOS, Aron et al., 1992), a one-item 





each pair represents the self and the other circle represents the relationship partner. This factor 
captures very broad conscious feelings of closeness with another person.  
The second factor that underlies psychological self-other overlap is overlapping mental 
representations, which “capture[s] perceived overlap on specific traits and attributes” (Myers & 
Hodges, 2012, p. 665).  The factor captures overlap in mental representations of specific traits 
between the self and other and maps closely with Davis and colleagues’ concept of self-other 
merging. As such, measures involve assessing the perceived traits or attributes of both the self 
and other, and calculating some type of difference score between the two (Batson et al., 1997; 
Davis et al., 1996; Slotter & Gardner, 2009).  For example, high overlapping mental 
representation between the self and other would occur if a participant rates both the self and the 
other person as having similar levels of a particular trait, such as agreeableness, suggesting that 
the participant perceives little difference between the self and other on this particular mental 
representation. Because the measure of overlapping mental representations assesses traits or 
attributes of the self and other separately, the factor may be less directly accessible to 
respondents than the measure of perceived closeness, which typically assesses the self directly in 
relation to the other person.1 
The two factors of self-other overlap are generally not correlated. Of the studies that 
reported correlations between measures of perceived closeness (i.e., IOS measure) and 
overlapping mental representations (i.e., trait measures), correlations typically are between the 
range of .03 ≤ r ≤ .20 (Batson et al., 1997; Myers & Hodges, 2012).  However, other research 
suggests that overlap in cognitive representations of self and others may be greater among 
emotionally close than non-close others (Aron et al., 1991 Study 3).2 





Over the past two decades, a large body of research has examined the role that self-other 
overlap plays in relationships and prosocial behavior. For instance, perceptions of more overlap 
between the self and other is associated with greater relationship satisfaction among couples 
(Acitelli & Young, 1996).  Self-other overlap also predicts a multitude of positive outcomes 
across time. Longitudinal studies of self-other overlap and relationship commitment among 
romantic relationships suggest that they have mutually reinforcing relationships, where self-other 
overlap predicts subsequent increases in relationship commitment and relationship commitment 
predicts subsequent increases in self-other overlap (Agnew, Van Lange, Rusbult, & Langston, 
1998). Among married couples, self-other overlap mediates the relationship between marital 
boredom and lower relationship satisfaction 9 years later (Tsapelas, Aron, & Orbuch, 2009). A 
meta-analysis of relationship factors that contribute to relationship dissolution over time found 
that self-other overlap is a strong predictor of lower relationship dissolution rates (Le, Dove, 
Agnew, Korn & Mutso, 2010). The research demonstrates that self-other overlap plays an 
important role in relationships.  
Self-other overlap may also facilitate prosocial behavior toward close others. For 
example, relationship closeness (manipulated by having participants reflect on a close or less-
close other, such as a family member, a good friend, an acquaintance, a near stranger) predicts 
greater helping of the other person in a distressing situation (e.g., if the other individual was 
evicted from his or her home; Cialdini et al., 1997). Furthermore, this effect is accounted by 
post-manipulation assessments of self-other overlap with the other person, but not by feelings of 
empathic concern for the other person (Cialdini et al., 1997).  Based on the findings, the 
researchers argue that self-other overlap is an important mechanism in the empathy-altruism 





al., 1997; Maner et al., 2002). Although the implications of the findings have been debated by 
other researchers within the empathy-altruism literature, who argue that empathic concern may 
be a better predictor of proscial behavior than self-other overlap (Batson, 1987, 1991, 1997; 
Batson et al., 1997), subsequent tests taking into consideration methodological issues from both 
sides of the debate have concluded that self-other overlap is a better predictor of helping than 
empathic concern (Maner et al., 2002). 
Given this review, it seems that self-other overlap plays an important role in relationships 
and prosocial behavior. However many questions remain. The present research attempts to 
clarify and extend the extant literature by exploring self-other overlap and prosocial behavior in 
close relationships in two contexts.  
1. First, what determines self-other overlap and how may this affect prosocial 
tendencies? Chapter II addresses this question by exploring the factors that influence 
the tendency to form self-other overlap, and whether these shifts in self-other overlap 
affect downstream prosocial tendencies in close relationships.  
2. Second, does self-other overlap moderate the consequences of prosocial behavior? 
Chapter III addresses this question by exploring whether a proxy for self-other 
overlap affects more long-term consequences of prosocial behavior, focusing on the 
important association between prosocial behavior and long-term health benefits. 
What Determines Self-other Overlap and How May It Affect Prosocial Tendencies? 
Self-other overlap develops and persists for a variety of reasons, such as from desiring to 
expand oneself (Aron & Aron, 1996, 1997; Aron, Norman, & Aron, 1998, 2001), sharing 
experiences with close others, disclosing intimate information about oneself (Agnew & 





the self (Slotter & Gardner, 2009). Less is known about what may hinder the process of 
including others into the self. One variable of interest is discrete emotions in close relationships. 
Emotions can influence relationship outcomes, but little is known about how emotions are 
related to and actively change perceptions of self-other overlap. Research on emotions and self-
other overlap are mainly correlational and primarily emerge from the empathy-altruism 
literature, which explores self-other overlap when responding to the needs of a suffering person. 
The causal implications of discrete emotions on self-other overlap in close relationships, and its 
function in prosocial behavior, continue to elude researchers. Furthermore, little theory or 
research has framed self-other overlap within the broader literature on appraisal theory and 
social-cognition.   
Chapter II addresses these gaps in the literature by exploring whether discrete emotions 
momentarily shift self-other overlap and how these shifts in self-other overlap may ultimately 
affect prosocial tendencies in close relationships. Guided by the appraisal tendency framework 
(Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Keltner, Horberg, & Oveis, 2006; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; 
Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Tiedens & Linton, 2001), I hypothesize that discrete emotions (e.g., 
anger) contribute cognitive and motivational consequences that readily interrupt the naturally 
unfolding self-other overlap processes in close relationships. To test this hypothesis, participants 
were asked to reflect on various interpersonal emotions commonly experienced in close 
relationships (Study 1: anger, happiness, neutral emotion; Study 2: sad, content, neutral emotion; 
Studies 3 and 4: anger, grateful, neutral emotion) to see how these discrete emotions affect self-
other overlap and subsequent helping. The impetus for choosing the five particular discrete 
emotions was to explore commonly experienced emotions in close relationships and to examine 





overlap. Also, whereas previous research examined the association between emotions and 
perceived closeness, the present research examined the role of emotions on overlapping mental 
representations, which is less directly accessible to participants and therefore makes the outcome 
less subject to experimental demand and social desirability. Furthermore, mental representations 
may be better situated within the broader framework of appraisal theory and social cognition, 
given the literature’s emphasis on exploring more unconscious processing of judgments.  
Does Self-other Overlap Moderate the Consequences of Prosocial Behavior? 
Chapter II examines whether emotions may momentarily shift self-other overlap to affect 
prosocial tendencies in close relationships. A logical extension of this research is to examine the 
long-term consequences of self-other overlap for prosocial behavior in close relationships. 
Specifically, does self-other overlap moderate the long-term consequences of prosocial 
behavior? 
Theory and research from close relationships suggests that self-other overlap may 
moderate prosocial behavior, so that people are motivated to help others with whom they share 
greater self-other overlap, namely others who are considered emotionally closer to the self 
(Cialdini et al., 1997). This motivation to help closer others most likely emerged from the 
caregiving system, a pattern of emotions, cognitions, and neurophysiology that has evolved to 
promote and maintain the formation of social bonds and to motivate helping (S. L. Brown, 
Brown, & Preston, 2011; S. L. Brown & Brown, 2006). The caregiving system is rooted in the 
maternal caregiving neural circuitry implicated during offspring care (S. L. Brown, Brown, et al., 
2011), and as such, the helping of one’s own children may activate the caregiving system to a 
greater degree than helping other targets. In fact, children are typically at the top of an 





with many weaker-strength communal relationships at the base (e.g., acquaintances), fewer 
medium-strength relationships in the middle (e.g., friends), and very few high-strength 
relationships at the top (e.g., children; Reis, Clark, & Holmes, 2004). People are motivated to 
meet the needs of individuals at the top of their hierarchy before the needs of others (Mills, 
Clark, Ford, & Johnson, 2004; Mills & Clark, 1982; Reis et al., 2004), suggesting that people are 
motivated to help their children. Furthermore, helping others has been associated with mental 
and physical health benefits for the self (Konrath & Brown, 2013).  One particularly important 
consequence of helping others is that it can predict lower mortality risk; providing support to 
others has been shown to predict lower mortality risk among older adults and among patients 
with end-stage diseases (S. L. Brown, Nesse, Vinokur, & Smith, 2003; McClellan, Stanwyck, & 
Anson, 1993). Connecting various research literatures, Studies 5a and 5b examine how giving to 
people of varying emotional closeness moderates the relationship between prosocial behavior 
and health. More specifically, does giving to children (who presumably activate the caregiving 
system to a greater degree) predict greater health benefits for the self, compared to giving to less 
close others?  
Chapter III addresses this question by examining the association between giving support 
at one time point and subsequent mortality risk, arguably a measure that captures cumulative 
physical health consequences across time. The study explores these associations a) within 
specific categories of close others that vary on emotional closeness, b) using healthy, non-
clinical older adult samples, c) across an extensive timeframe (i.e., 17 years). Using data from 
the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS), Studies 5a and 5b examined whether giving support to 
specific support recipients (e.g., children, parents, siblings, other relatives, friends and 





and among childless individuals (Study 5b). I hypothesize that giving to recipients who directly 
activate the maternal caregiving system, namely children, would predict greater long-term health 
benefits for the self, suggesting that giving to one’s children may predict reduced mortality risk 
relative to giving to other support partners.  
Summary of Research Questions 
Figure I.1 presents schematic representations of the hypotheses.  In Chapter II (see Figure 
I.1A), I will explore the research question “What determines self-other overlap and how may this 
affect prosocial tendencies?” by suggesting that discrete emotions could momentarily shift self-
other overlap processes to impact downstream prosocial tendencies in close relationships. In 
Chapter III (see Figure I.1B), I will explore the research question “Does self-other overlap 
moderate the consequences of prosocial behavior?” by suggesting that self-other overlap may 
moderate the association between prosocial behavior and health.  
Chapter IV will summarize and discuss the main findings from Chapters II and III. The 











What Determines Self-other Overlap and How May It Affect Prosocial Tendencies? 
People desire to expand the self by including the resources, perspectives, and traits of 
others into the self to enhance their self-efficacy, intrinsic motivation, and self-actualization 
(Aron & Aron, 1996, 1997; Aron et al., 1998, 2001). This self-expansion motivation merges the 
self-concept of the close other with one’s own, creating overlapping mental representations 
between the self and other, or more broadly, self-other overlap. Self-other overlap can develop 
and persist through the mechanisms of shared experiences (e.g., going to the movies together) 
and self-disclosures (e.g., telling the partner about one’s past; Agnew & Etcheverry, 2006; Aron 
et al., 1991, 1997). However, in the absence of shared experiences or self-disclosure, the mere 
motivation to draw the other person closer is enough to evoke self-other overlap with existing 
and potential partners (Slotter & Gardner, 2009). In close relationships, people’s self-concepts 
are so entwined with the mental representations of their close other that they sometimes confuse 
traits of the self with those of the other person (Mashek et al., 2003). When a relationship 
dissolves, people may experience reduced self-concept clarity, giving credence to the commonly 
posed post-breakup question, “Who am I without you?” (Slotter, Gardner, & Finkel, 2010).  
How Do Emotions Relate to Self-other Overlap? 
Research has primarily focused on the factors that contribute to and maintain self-other 





in existing relationships. Relationships are fraught with emotions that could shift important 
relational outcomes and such emotions may be prime factors for exploration.  
Existing research on emotion and self-other overlap arose mainly from the empathy-
altruism debate, which explored whether self-other overlap mediates the empathy-altruism 
relationship. Within this context, measures of self-other overlap (typically measures of “oneness” 
that map onto the perceived closeness factor of psychological self-other overlap), empathic 
emotions (e.g., sympathetic, compassionate, softhearted, and tender), sadness (e.g., sad, low-
spirited, and heavy-hearted), and personal distress (e.g., alarmed, worried, distressed, upset) are 
all moderately correlated (Cialdini et al., 1997; Maner et al., 2002). However, most research 
within this literature focuses on self-other overlap and emotions that were elicited in response to 
a suffering stranger (e.g., a person who was evicted from his or her apartment, or the Katie 
Banks story of a young college woman struggling after the death of her parents). Within the 
specific context of a suffering stranger, the experience of perceived closeness is mildly 
associated with a mixture of greater empathy, sadness and distress. Rarely has research 
examined how emotions commonly experienced in relationships in general shift self-other 
overlap. Furthermore, to date, no studies have experimentally manipulated discrete negative and 
positive emotions to explore its effects on self-other overlap in close relationships. Doing so will 
shed light onto the casual implications of discrete emotions on self-other overlap and its function 
in prosocial tendencies. 
Why May Emotions Shift Overlapping Mental Representations? 
Prior research offers a number of alternative predictions concerning how emotions 
experienced in relationships should influence self-other overlap. Some research suggests that a 





emotion and its downstream outcomes typically separate emotions into negative and positive 
emotions. This approach applies to both integral emotions, where subjective emotional 
experiences influence relevant judgments and choices (e.g., anticipated regret of gambling 
influences willingness to gamble, Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997), as well as incidental 
affect, where subject experiences effect irrelevant judgments and choices (e.g., the feeling-as-
information model, see Schwarz, 1990).  Emotion researchers from this approach may opt for a 
more parsimonious hypothesis regarding emotion and self-other overlap, positing that negative 
emotions, in general, may undermine self-other overlap, whereas positive emotions may promote 
self-other overlap. In support, past research has suggested that self-other overlap is correlated 
with dispositional positive and negative measures of emotions (i.e., how participants generally 
felt over the past two weeks or the last month) in response to a partner who is not suffering (e.g., 
a new roommate; Waugh & Fredrickson, 2006).  Specifically, greater perceived closeness is 
associated with moderately less negative emotions and moderately more positive emotions at one 
time point (Waugh & Fredrickson, 2006).  Although conclusions of causality cannot be made 
from these correlations, one interpretation of the findings suggests that inducing negative 
emotions may lead to less self-other overlap and inducing positive emotions may lead to more 
self-other overlap – regardless of the specific positive or negative emotions.   
Other approaches to emotion research, such as the appraisal tendency framework, take a 
more nuanced perspective on emotions that differentiates discrete positive and negative emotions 
by their appraisal tendencies (Han et al., 2007; Keltner et al., 2006; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 
2001; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Tiedens & Linton, 2001).  Appraisal theorists argue that discrete 
emotions are distinguished by their distinct set of appraisals (Lazarus, 1991; C. A. Smith & 





its unique appraisals of responsibility/agency (other person is responsible), control (high 
individual control over events), and certainty (high certainty; Averill, 1983; Betancourt & Blair, 
1992; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a, p. 1; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Weiner, Graham, & 
Chandler, 1982). More importantly, the appraisal tendency framework suggests that an emotion’s 
distinct set of appraisals contributes to downstream emotion-specific influences on judgments 
and decision making (Han et al., 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). Rather than engaging in 
the debate of directionality from cognition-to-emotion or emotion-to-cognition, the appraisal 
tendency framework adopts a recursive perspective in which discrete emotions arise from their 
unique appraisal patterns, but can also carryover to downstream judgments and decisions through 
their appraisal patterns and themes (Han, Lerner, Keltner, 2007). In essence, in the appraisal 
tendency framework, discrete emotions arising from their distinct set of appraisals could elicit 
implicit cognitive tendencies to appraise downstream events through specific processes known as 
“appraisal tendencies,” and these appraisal tendencies facilitate appropriate responding to the 
emotion-triggering event, carrying over to downstream thought content and depth, and ultimately 
judgment and decision making (Han et al., 2007). The appraisal tendency framework can explain 
how cognitive appraisals of discrete emotions differentially predict judgments and choices like 
the perceptions of risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001), attributions of causality and 
responsibility (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993), assessments of losses and gains (Lerner, 
Small, & Loewenstein, 2004), and judgments of effort (Tiedens & Linton, 2001).   
Situated within the appraisal tendency framework of emotions, the present study argues 
that specific discrete emotions may shift perceptions of self-other overlap (specifically, the 
overlapping mental representations factor). I hypothesize that the appraisal pattern within each 





to subsequent social-cognitive consequences in close relationships. Because the carryover effects 
of discrete emotions may be deactivated when an individual becomes aware of his or her own 
judgment and choice processes (Han et al., 2007), a less conscious measure of self-other overlap 
may be more appropriate for the present paradigm. Deactivation of carryover effects may occur 
because cognitive appraisals of emotion are more automatic (Ekman, 1992; Lazarus, 1991; 
LeDoux, 1996). Supporting the greater automaticity of emotion-related appraisals, judgments of 
happiness and satisfaction with life can be altered by bringing awareness to other attributions that 
may explain the mood, and this may be more true for negative moods than positive moods 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Given how awareness of judgment processes in carryover effects 
could disrupt the automatic carryover effects of appraisal tendencies, it may be more appropriate 
to examine the effects of discrete emotions on the less conscious factor of self-other overlap, that 
is, of overlapping mental representations (rather than closeness).  
Because appraisal patterns automatically implicate downstream judgment and decision 
making, the present research posits that appraisal patterns of discrete emotions may disrupt or 
foster overlapping mental representations in close relationships. Furthermore because self-other 
overlap has been linked with prosocial behavior (Cialdini et al., 1997; Maner et al., 2002), 
disruption of overlapping mental representations from anger may undermine prosocial 
tendencies. Of particular interest may be the carryover effects of commonly experienced 
emotions within close relationships, such as anger, sadness, happiness, contentment, and 
gratitude. 
Hypothesizing that anger elicits unique cognitive and motivational processes that would 
more readily impede self-other overlap and possibly subsequent prosocial tendencies, Study 1 





effects on self-other overlap and prosocial tendencies, in comparison to a happy or neutral 
experience. Studies 2, 3, and 4 ruled out a general negative valence explanation (Study 2), 
examined interpersonal gratitude to explore whether other agency-related appraisal could shift 
self-other overlap among positive emotions (Study 3), and tested whether relationship type is a 
boundary condition for self-other overlap processes among marital partners (Study 4).   
Study 1: Anger Versus Happiness and Control Among Close Friends 
Anger toward close others is a normative occurrence in close relationships that may 
directly change self-other overlap and altruism. Based on research on the appraisal patterns of 
anger and the important role of self-other overlap for altruism, I predict that anger, compared to 
other positive or neutral emotions, should impede self-other overlap processes and the desire to 
help others in close relationships. Furthermore, anger should undermine the desire to help a close 
other, because it directly undermines self-other overlap.  
First, anger is hypothesized to impede self-other processes in close relationships, 
compared to other emotions because of its appraisal tendencies (see Table II.1 for a summary of 
appraisals related to various discrete emotions outlined in in Chapter II). Anger arises from 
appraisals of other-responsibility for a negative event, individual control, and a sense of certainty 
regarding the occurring event (Averill, 1983; Betancourt & Blair, 1992; C. A. Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985; Weiner et al., 1982). People feel angry when they appraise that another person 
is responsible (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Fischer, 1991; Frijda, 1986; Ortony, Clore, & 
Collins, 1988; C. A. Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Wierzbicka, 1992) for an event that blocks their 
goals or present obstacles for the self (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Izard, 1977; C. A. Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985) and involves a threat to self-esteem (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; 





close other who is appraised to be responsible for contributing obstacles that block ones goals 
and poses a threat to self-esteem, then they may be more likely to judge that person to have 
negative traits and more hesitant to include those negative traits into the mental representations 
of the self. In partial support, some research suggests that during the process of including others 
into the self, people may be more hesitant to include negative traits into the self than positive 
traits (Davis et al., 1996; Myers & Hodges, 2012).  
Furthermore, anger elicits cognitive or social outcomes that could undermine 
relationships. Anger creates more negative downstream judgment and decisions (for review, see 
Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). For instance, anger can undermine trust in co-workers, and this effect 
could be explained by other responsibility appraisals (J. R. Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005).  
Incidental anger also leads to less trust and reception to advice than a neutral emotion (Gino & 
Schweitzer, 2008). Anger has been associated with the action tendency to move against the 
perceived obstacles created by the perpetrator through antagonistic approaches like opposition  
(Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989), the urge to hurt the other person (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; 
Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994), and a recursive anger-blame loop against the perpetrator 
(Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996).  
Could anger reduce helping in close relationships? Given the reviewed detrimental 
effects of anger for close relationships, I hypothesize that anger would undermine the desire to 
help a close other, compared to other emotions. Past evidence supports this prediction. For 
example, incidental anger makes people less likely to help others, compared to a neutral emotion 
(Small & Lerner, 2008). Also, an anger induction predicted more punitive attributions than an 
induction of a more neutral state (Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998).  Therefore anger is 





Lastly, I hypothesize that anger would lead to less helping in close relationships, because 
anger impedes self-other overlap processes in close relationships, compared to other positive or 
neutral emotions. In other words, I hypothesize that the relationship between anger and helping is 
mediated by changes in self-other overlap. This hypothesis is driven by past research suggesting 
that self-other overlap is an important precursor to altruism (Cialdini et al., 1997; Maner et al., 
2002). In sum, anger may be a unique emotion that should specifically influence self-other 
overlap and helping.  
Would Happiness Change Self-other Overlap and Helping?   
Fredrickson’s broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions (1998, 2001) posits that 
positive emotions broaden people’s attention, thoughts, and behaviors to increase the range of 
potential thought-action action tendencies. These broadened thought-action repertoires can 
ultimately build enduring physical, intellectual, psychological, and social resources. The 
broaden-and-build theory would predict that positive emotions broaden people’s sense of self to 
include others, suggesting that the experience of positive emotions may lead to increased self-
other overlap. In support, a correlational study found that the experience of positive emotions is 
associated with greater self-other overlap with new roommates among first-year college students 
(Waugh & Fredrickson, 2006). However, no research has examined whether these findings 
replicate in an experimental context, which would strengthen conclusions of causality. 
Furthermore, the correlations between self-other overlap and positive emotions were based on 
the closeness factor of self-other overlap instead of the overlapping mental representations 
factor. Moreover, the study used a merged construct of positive emotions from multiple discrete 





perhaps the induction of discrete positive emotions would increase overlapping mental 
representations since such emotions broaden thought-action repertoires.  
Of particular interest is the experience of happiness in close relationships. Appraisal 
theories suggest that happiness does not involve appraisals that directly implicate self-other 
overlap. Happy emotions arise when an individual appraises a situation as pleasant, that involves 
little effort, high certainty, and captures attention (C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Theorists 
agree that the central appraisal pattern of happiness is motive consistency (Ellsworth & Smith, 
1988a; Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman, 2001; Klaus R. Scherer, 2001), meaning that the individual 
has fulfilled a desired motive, whether it is the human need for belonging or more specific goals 
(Lazarus, 1991). Most importantly, happiness does not involve a high other agency appraisal. 
Instead happiness is associated with appraisals of moderate self agency (i.e., the self may have 
brought about the events) and moderate human control (i.e., either the self or another person had 
the ability to influence what was happening; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  
Although research has examined the appraisal dimensions of happiness (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2001; Tiedens & Linton, 2001), it is nevertheless generally considered the least 
differentiated positive emotion (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a, 1988b; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985). From an appraisal tendency framework, research on the effects of discrete positive 
emotions on the content and depth of processing is still in its infancy. Some research has found 
that happiness is similar to anger in that they both elicit more optimistic judgments and choices 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2001), while others have found that happiness may lead to more heuristic 
processing because of its higher certainty appraisal (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Given the recent 
interest and burgeoning research examining discrete positive emotions, a logical extension of the 





affect self-other overlap and altruism. Based on Fredrickson’s broaden-and-build theory of 
positive emotions (1998, 2001), one hypothesis argues that discrete positive emotions would 
increase overlapping mental representations by broadening thought-action repertoires. 
Alternatively, because the appraisal patterns of happiness does not necessarily involve high other 
agency, an alternative hypothesis would argue that happiness may not necessarily shift 
overlapping mental representations.  
Does happiness lead to greater helping? In general, happy individuals volunteer more at 
charities and community service than unhappy individuals, (Krueger, Hicks, & McGue, 2001; 
Thoits & Hewitt, 2001) and they spend more time volunteering (Thoits & Hewitt, 2001). In a 
number of studies, positive affect or mood has been shown to increase helping (Carlson, Charlin, 
& Miller, 1988; Isen, 1999). Experimental evidence generally supports the happiness-
prosociality link. For example the induction of positive mood through positive events (i.e., 
receiving cookies or discovering a dime in a payphone) resulted in greater helping, relative to a 
neutral condition (e.g., no cookies or dime; Aderman, 1972; Isen & Levin, 1972). Based on this 
evidence, I hypothesize that happiness would lead to greater helping.  
To summarize, I hypothesize that anger, compared to positive or neutral emotions, should 
impede self-other overlap processes and the desire to help others in close relationships because 
of its appraisal tendencies. Furthermore, anger is hypothesized to undermine the desire to help a 
close other, because it directly undermines self-other overlap. It is unclear how happiness will 
affect downstream social-cognitive consequences; a strictly valence approach would suggest that 
happiness will increase self-other overlap, but appraisal theory suggests it would not necessarily 
affect self-other overlap due to the absence of other agency in happiness.  Happiness is expected 





examined whether reflecting on anger, happiness, and a neutral experience (as control condition) 
with a close friend differentially predicts self-other overlap and helping. Furthermore, because 
self-other overlap is an important precursor to helping, Study 1 also tested whether condition 
effects on helping are mediated by differences in self-other overlap.  
Method 
Participants and procedures. One hundred and three undergraduate students (33 men, 
69 women; mean age = 18.75 years, SD = 0.97 years) participated in the lab in groups of 1 to 4 
in partial fulfillment of a subject pool course requirement.  The sample was 64.7% 
White/Caucasian, 5.9% Black/African American, 21.6% Asian, 2.0% Middle Eastern, 1% 
American Indian/Alaskan Native, 3.9% Other and 1% not reported.  Participants completed the 
study in the lab on their own, guided by the online survey program Qualtrics. First, participants 
were informed that the present study explored feelings, memory, language, and visual spatial 
perception.  After giving their informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to either 
recall an angry, happy, or neutral experience with a close friend. They then reflected on the 
causes and reasons underlying their emotional experience for 30 seconds, and completed 
manipulation checks of valence, arousal, and anger. Participants then rated their level of self-
other overlap with the friend identified in the interpersonal experience and the degree to which 
they would help their friend if s/he were evicted from his/her home. Participants were then 
debriefed and compensated ½ hour of subject pool credit.  
Exclusions. Two participants were excluded because the experiment program 
unexpectedly malfunctioned half way through the study.  
Conditions. Participants were randomly assigned into one of three conditions in which 





close friend. See Appendix A for the verbatim instructions for each emotion manipulation. In the 
angry condition, participants were asked to recall a past experience in which they “felt angry at a 
close friend” and to “identify a specific experience …that makes [them] feel overwhelmed with 
anger when [they] think about it now” (n=35).  In the happy condition participants recalled an 
experience in which they “felt happy with a close friend” and to “identify a specific 
experience…that makes [them] feel overwhelmed with happiness when [they] think about it 
now” (n=35).  In the control condition, participants recalled an experience in which they 
“completed a daily activity with a close friend….such as shopping for groceries, doing laundry 
or dishes, or studying in the library” and to “identify a specific experience ….that does not make 
[them] feel particularly positive or negative when [they] think about it now” (n=32).  After 
recalling the experience, participants were instructed to reflect on the causes and reasons 
underlying the thoughts and feelings they experienced during the recalled experience for 30 
seconds.  
 Manipulation checks. 
 Self-assessment manikin. Self-assessment manikin (SAM, Bradley & Lang, 1994) was 
assessed to evaluate participants’ valence and arousal to the recalled experience. The valence 
measure asked participants to use a series of graphic portraits to “rate how you are feeling 
RIGHT NOW from unhappy to happy” on a scale of 1 (unhappy) to 9 (happy); M = 5.83, SD = 
1.71.  The graphic portraits were arranged along a continuous scale, starting from a deep frown 
to a wide smile.  The arousal measure asked participants to “rate how you are feeling RIGHT 
NOW from calm to excited” on a scale of 1 (calm) to 9 (excited), following a continuous scale of 






 Anger. Anger was also assessed by asking participants “To what extent did you feel 
angry at the person you had previously identified as you thought about the experience?” on a 
scale from 1 to 9 (1 = not at all) to 5 (somewhat) to 9(very much) ; M = 3.86, SD = 2.77. 
 Self-other overlap. Participants then completed a trait measure of self-other overlap that 
was adopted from Slotter & Gardner (2009). Participants first rated themselves on 15 randomly 
presented traits (i.e., athletic, artistic, musical, theatrical, intelligent, studious, thoughtful, 
outgoing, enthusiastic, adventurous, creative, risk-taking, agreeable, ambitious, and inventive) on 
a scale from 1(not at all characteristic of me) to 3 (somewhat characteristic of me) to 7 
(extremely characteristic of me). Afterwards, they rated the other person they had previously 
identified from the emotion recall on each of the randomly presented traits from 1 (not at all 
characteristic of the other person) to 7(extremely characteristic of the other person). 
Self-other overlap was calculated by taking absolute value of the difference score 
between participant ratings and partner ratings for each of the 15 traits. These absolute value 
scores were then averaged across the 15 traits. For example, if a participant rated both the self 
and the partner as extremely high on the trait agreeableness, a rating of 7 for both, the absolute 
value of the difference score would yield a 0, suggesting a complete overlap in the mental 
representation of agreeableness and that lower scores from this calculation indicated greater self-
other overlap. For ease of interpretation, the final score was then reverse scored so that larger 
values would indicate greater self-other overlap; M = 5.60, SD = .59. 
Helping. To measure helping, the present study adopted Cialdini et al. (1997)’s measure 
of helping, which is commonly used in the empathy-altruism literature. Specifically, the measure 
asked participants to imagine that their close friend had been evicted from his or her apartment. 





would give the person apartment listing websites, 3) I would help the person find a new place to 
live by driving the person around for a few hours, 4) I would have the person stay with me for a 
couple of days (provided I had the space), 5) I would have the person come stay with me for a 
week (provided I had the space), 6) I would offer to have the person come stay with me until he 
or she found a new place (provided I had the space), and 7) I would offer to let the person come 
live with me rent free (provided I had the space); M = 5.35, SD = 1.54.   
Results 
 Manipulation checks. Three separate one-way ANOVA’s with condition as a between-
subjects factor were conducted on SAM valence, SAM arousal, and anger. All significant 
condition effects were followed by post-hoc tests using a Tukey HSD correction (see Table II.2 
for the means, standard errors, and post-hoc comparisons for all dependent variables by 
condition from Studies 1 to 4).  A significant main effect of condition on SAM valence, F(2, 99) 
= 32.95, p <.001, η²=.40, indicated that participants in the angry condition (M = 4.40) were 
significantly less happy than those in the happy condition (M = 6.91), p <.001, and significantly 
less happy than those in control condition (M = 6.22), p <.001. Participants in the happy 
condition were marginally more happy than those in the control condition, p=.089.  
A significant main effect of condition on anger, F(2, 99) = 81.73, p <.001, η²=.622, 
indicated that participants in the angry condition (M = 6.83) were significantly more angry than 
those in the happy condition (M = 1.89), p <.001, and significantly more angry than those in 
control condition (M = 2.78), p <.001. Participants in the happy condition were marginally less 





No significant main effect of condition was found for SAM arousal, F<1, suggesting that 
participants in the angry (M = 4.23), happy (M = 4.37), and control (M = 3.59) conditions 
experienced similar levels of arousal.  
 Self-other overlap. A one-way ANOVA with condition as the between-subjects factor 
was conducted on self-other overlap. There was a significant condition effect F(2, 99) = 8.40, 
p<.001, η²=.145. Post-hoc tests indicated that participants in the angry condition (M = 5.30) had 
significantly less self-other overlap than those in the happy condition (M = 5.68), p=.014, as well 
as those in the control condition (M = 5.84), p<.001. There were no significant mean differences 
in self-other overlap between participants in the happy and control condition, p=.475. 
 Helping. A one-way ANOVA with condition as the between-subjects factor was 
conducted on helping. A significant condition effect was found, F(2, 99) = 4.66, p=.012, 
η²=.086. Post-hoc test indicated that participants in the angry condition (M = 4.74) were 
significantly less likely to help than those in the control condition (M = 5.78), p=.014, and 
marginally less likely to help those in the happy condition (M = 5.57), p = .056. There were no 
significant mean differences between those in the happy and control conditions, p=.833. 
Mediation. To test the hypotheses, analyses examined whether self-other overlap 
mediated the condition effect on helping. Because the condition variable has 3 categories (i.e., 
anger, happy, and control), the analyses employed Hayes and Preacher’s (2013) method of 
testing mediation with a multi-categorical independent variable using the MEDIATE macro for 
SPSS. Indicator coding was specified to create 2 dummy independent variables (D1: anger = 0, 
happy = 1, control = 0; D2: anger = 0, happy = 0, control = 1), that implicitly designated the 
anger condition as the reference group (i.e., designated as 0 in both D1 and D2). D1 and D2 were 





helping, 2) indirect effect of condition on the mediator (self-other overlap), and 3) indirect effect 
of self-other overlap on helping and indirect effect of condition on helping through the mediator.  
The statistical coefficients presented report group differences between the comparison group 
(i.e., either happy in D1 or control in D2) in relation to the reference group (i.e., anger condition).  
Because the Sobel’s test imposes distributional assumptions regarding the tests of significant 
indirect effects that make it less reliable in smaller samples, the boostrapping method was used 
per recommendations by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008). The bootstrapping method randomly 
selected 10,000 bootstrapped samples to estimate the indirect effect within each of the resampled 
dataset.   Figure II.1 presents the results of the mediation analyses testing whether self-other 
overlap mediates the relationship between condition and helping.  
Condition predicting helping (total effects). When D1 and D2 were entered 
simultaneously as predictors of helping, results suggest that relative to those in the anger 
condition, participants in the happy condition (b = .83, t = 2.33, p = .022) and participants in the 
control condition (b = 1.03, t = 2.86, p =.005) were both more likely to help the close other, F(2, 
99) = 4.65, p = .012, R2 = .09.  
Condition predicting self-other overlap (indirect effects). When D1 and D2 were entered 
simultaneously as predictors of self-other overlap, results suggest that relative to those in the 
anger condition, participants in the happy condition (b = .38, t = 2.86, p = .005) and participants 
in the control condition (b = .54, t = 3.96, p < .001) were both more likely to report greater self-
other overlap with others, F(2, 99) = 8.40, p < .001, R2 = .15.  
Self-other overlap predicting helping and condition predicting helping, controlling for 
each other (indirect effects). When D1, D2, and self-other overlap were entered simultaneously 





controlling for the effect of condition (b = .75, t = 2.88, p = .005), F(2, 99) = 6.09, p < .001, R2 = 
.16. Furthermore, the condition effect of happy relative to anger (D1) on helping was reduced to 
non-significance (b = .55, t = 1.53, p=.130), and the condition effect of control relative to anger 
was reduced to marginal significance (D2) on helping (b = .64, t = 1.69, p = .095). 
Bootstrapping. Bootstrapping based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and 95% bias-corrected 
confidence intervals for the relative indirect effect indicated that both the happy condition 
(relative to anger condition) and control condition (relative to anger condition) indirectly 
influenced helping through self-other overlap (D1: 95% CI = .056 to .738; D2 95% CI = .097 to 
.894).  
Discussion 
Study 1 found that discrete emotions in close relationships have the ability to 
momentarily shift relationship processes like overlapping mental representations and helping. 
Specifically, reflecting on a past anger experience involving a close friend led to significantly 
lower inclusion of mental representations of that close friend into the individual’s own mental 
representations, compared to reflecting on a past happy or neutral experience. This suggests that 
the experience of anger in close relationships undermines naturally unfolding self-other overlap 
processes that are crucial in close relationships, compared to reflecting on happiness or a more 
neutral experiences. Reflecting on anger also led to significantly less desire to help that friend in 
a time of need, compared to reflecting on an interpersonal neutral experience, and marginally 
less desire to help that friend compared to reflecting on happiness. Mediation analyses found that 
perceptions of self-other overlap mediate the relationship between condition and less helping.  





close relationships because it undermines the self-other overlap processes that naturally unfold in 
close relationships.  
 Interestingly, there were no significant mean differences in self-other overlap between 
participants in the happy and control condition, suggesting that the findings were asymmetric to 
anger impeding self-other overlap, whereas happiness and neutral experiences do not necessarily 
affect self-other overlap.  This suggests that anger is a key emotion that serves important 
implications for subsequent self-other overlap and helping in close relationships. Furthermore, 
the findings could be interpreted from the framework of appraisal theory where the lack of other 
agency in happiness may account for the absence of effect for self-other overlap.   
The findings from the manipulation checks suggest that the manipulation was effective in 
eliciting the desired emotion.  Participants who reflected on a past angry experience with a close 
friend were significantly angrier and less happy than those who reflected on a past happy or a 
neutral experience. Participants who were in the happy condition were marginally less angry and 
happier than those who were in the control condition. Therefore the angry condition elicited 
anger and less happy feelings, whereas the happy and control conditions were only marginally 
different, though in the predicted direction. Explanations of why this may occur will be discussed 
later.  
Study 2: Sadness Versus Contentment and Control Among Close Friends 
One interpretation of the negative effect anger has on self-other overlap and helping 
points to the unique appraisal tendencies of anger. However, an alternative interpretation 
suggests that the differences between anger and the other emotions in Study 1 could be simply 
explained by a more parsimonious valence framework (i.e., negative vs. positive emotions).  Past 





others, whereas positive emotions are correlated with more self-other overlap (Waugh & 
Fredrickson, 2006), suggesting that a valence framework may account for the social-cognitive 
differences between anger and happiness. Therefore one point of inquiry in Study 2 is to test 
whether the induction of any negative emotion would undermine self-other overlap and helping, 
relative to the induction of any positive emotion or control. To address this concern, Study 2 
extends on Study 1’s experimental paradigm by having participants reflect on alternative 
emotions that match on valence (i.e., sadness and contentment) that are also prevalent in close 
relationships.  
Would Sadness Reduce Self-other Overlap and Helping?  
Guided by the appraisal theories of emotion, I predict that alternative negative emotions, 
like sadness, would not undermine self-other overlap compared to positive and neutral emotions 
because sadness does not elicit similar appraisal themes as anger.  Furthermore, this hypothesis 
emphasizes that an appraisal tendency framework may be more appropriate than a strict valence 
approach when examining emotions’ effects on downstream social-cognitive outcomes. Sadness 
arises with appraisal themes of irrevocable loss (Lazarus, 1991), and may promote reward 
seeking, relative to other negative emotions (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). Like anger, sadness is 
a response to goal failure and frequently co-occurs with anger (Levine, 1995; Stein & Levine, 
1989).  The differentiating appraisal between anger and sadness concerns agency: people feel 
angry when they appraise the situation as caused by another person’s intentional harm or 
negligence; people feel sad when they appraise the situation as caused by circumstances beyond 
the other person’s control (Averill, 1982; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Ortony et al., 1988).  
Directly comparing the appraisal tendencies of the two emotions on social judgments suggests 





as situationally caused and to attribute responsibility of an ambiguous event to be more 
situationally caused than by human agency (Keltner et al., 1993).  Therefore sadness arises when 
people appraise a situation as impersonal, where perhaps nothing can be done to set it right. 
Because sadness does not directly draw upon an agency appraisal in which another person is 
responsible for the event or is hurting or threatening the self, I would not expect sadness to 
undermine self-other overlap. 
How would sadness implicate helping? Previous research suggests that while incidental 
anger leads to less helping, compared to a neutral emotion, sadness leads to more helping (Small 
& Lerner, 2008).  However, the relationship between induced sadness and helping is dependent 
on whether participants believe helping will be instrumental to improving their mood. This may 
be related to the more reward seeking nature of sadness, relative to other negative emotions 
(Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). For example, saddened participants are more likely to help than 
neutral mood controls only if they believe that their mood is changeable. When saddened 
participants believe that helping cannot improve their mood, they are no more helpful than 
neutral mood participants (Manucia, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984).  Based on this research, I do 
not have specific hypotheses regarding how sadness would affect helping, because whether 
participants believe helping would be instrumental to improving their mood or not is beyond the 
scope of the present research. Even if sadness predicts more helping, I would not expect that 
process to occur through self-other overlap because sadness is not expected to predict self-other 
overlap.  
Would Contentment Change Self-other Overlap and Helping? 
Like happiness, an appraisal theory of contentment involves appraisals that are not 





differentiated than negative ones, less research has been done to distinguish contentment from 
happiness. In general, the two emotions are regarded as very similar. The core appraisal pattern 
of contentment, like happiness, involves motive consistency, where contentment arises when an 
individual attains a motive that is desired (Lazarus, 1991). However, it remains unknown 
whether contentment involves human agency or circumstantial agency. Some evidence suggest 
that contentment is associated with perceived individual control to cope with situations (Goetz, 
Frenzel, Stoeger, & Hall, 2010). Based on this literature, one hypothesis is that the induction of 
contentment may not necessarily increase self-other overlap because it is not necessarily related 
to other-oriented appraisal patterns of agency.  
How does contentment predict helping? Because contentment is generally not 
differentiated from happiness, past research linking positive mood and helping may apply to 
contentment as well. Past research on positive affect or mood suggest that it leads to greater 
helping (Aderman, 1972; Carlson et al., 1988; Isen & Levin, 1972; Isen, 1999). Therefore we 
would expect contentment, like happiness, to increase helping, relative to the other conditions. 
Calling to mind the research suggesting that sadness does not share the same appraisal 
tendencies as anger in attributing blame on other agency, I hypothesized that reflecting on a sad 
experience relative to a content experience and neutral control would not predict differences in 
self-other overlap.  Sadness may still predict helping, depending on whether people believe 
helping may improve their mood, relative to positive or neutral emotions, but even so, I would 
not expect that process to occur through self-other overlap because sadness is not expected to 
predict self-other overlap.  Lastly, contentment, relative to sadness or control, may or may not 






 Participants and procedures. Seventy-six undergraduate students (28 men, 48 women; 
mean age = 19.05 years, SD = 1.06 years) participated in the lab in groups of 1 to 4 in partial 
fulfillment of a subject pool course requirement.  The sample was 63.2% White/Caucasian, 5.3% 
Black/African American, 22.4% Asian, 2.6% Middle Eastern, 1.3% Native Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander, and 5.3% Other.  Participants completed the study in the lab on their own, guided by 
the online survey program Qualtrics. The procedure of Study 2 was very similar to that of Study 
1, except that participants were randomly assigned to either recall a sad, content, or neutral 
experience with a close friend.   
Exclusions. Four participants were excluded because they were interrupted during the 
experiment by either loud talking in the adjacent room or by a late participant. In addition, one 
participant was excluded because of a computer malfunction halfway through the study and one 
was excluded because the experimenter thought the participant appeared to be rushing through 
the study.  
 Conditions. Participants were randomly assigned into one of three conditions in which 
they were asked to recall a sad, content, or neutral experience (control condition) with a close 
friend. See Appendix A for the verbatim instructions in each of the emotion manipulations. In 
the sad condition, participants were asked to recall a past experience in which they “felt sad or 
depressed because of an experience you shared with a close friend” and to “identify a specific 
experience… that makes [them] feel overwhelmed with sadness when [they] think about it now” 
(n=25).  In the content condition participants recalled an experience in which they “content or 
satisfied because of an experience you shared with a close friend” and to “identify a specific 
experience…that makes [them] feel overwhelmed with contentment when [they] think about it 





condition of Study 1 (n=26).  After recalling the experience, participants were instructed to 
reflect on the causes and reasons underlying the thoughts and feelings they experienced during 
the recalled experience for 30 seconds.  
 Manipulation checks. 
 Self-assessment manikin. The Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM, Bradley & Lang, 1994) 
was assessed to evaluate participants’ valence and arousal to the recalled experience. The 
valence measure asked participants to use a series of graphic portraits to “rate how you are 
feeling RIGHT NOW from unhappy to happy” on a scale of 1 (unhappy) to 9 (happy); M = 5.76, 
SD = 1.76.  The graphic portraits were arranged along a continuous scale, starting from a deep 
frown to a wide smile.  The arousal measure asked participants to “rate how you are feeling 
RIGHT NOW from calm to excited” on a scale of 1 (calm) to 9 (excited), following a continuous 
scale of graphic portraits starting from sleepy, with eyes close to excited with eyes open; M = 
3.36, SD = 1.65.  
 Sadness. Sadness was also assessed by asking participants “To what extent did you feel 
sad as you thought about the experience?” on a scale from 1 to 9 (1 = not at all) to 5 (somewhat) 
to 9(very much); M = 3.96, SD = 2.22. 
 Self-other overlap. Participants completed the same trait measure of self-other overlap 
as Study 1, where they rated themselves and the other person on 15 randomly presented traits 
(e.g., athletic, intelligent, creative, etc.) on a scale from 1(not at all characteristic of me) to 3 
(somewhat characteristic of me / the other person) to 7 (extremely characteristic of me / the 
other person). The final self-other overlap variable followed the same calculation process as that 





 Helping. Helping was measured by the same measure used in Study 1, where participants 
were asked to imagine that their close friend had been evicted from his or her apartment and rate 
which of the seven present options they would do to help their friend, e.g., from 1) I would do 
nothing to 7) I would offer to let the person come live with me rent free (provided I had the 
space); M = 5.59, SD = 1.50.   
Results 
 Manipulation checks. Three separate one-way ANOVA’s with condition as a between-
subjects factor were conducted on SAM valence, SAM arousal, and sadness. All significant 
condition effects were followed by post-hoc tests using a Tukey HSD correction (see Table II.2). 
A significant main effect of condition on SAM valence, F(2, 73) = 21.80, p <.001, η²=.373, 
indicated that participants in the sad condition (M = 4.28) were significantly less happy than 
those in the content condition (M = 6.80), p <.001, and significantly less happy than those in 
control condition (M = 6.19), p <.001. There were no significant differences in feeling happy 
between participants in the content and the control condition, p=.279, though the means were in 
the predicted direction.  
A significant main effect of condition on sadness, F(2, 73) = 18.91, p <.001, η²=.341, 
indicated that participants in the sad condition (M = 5.80) were significantly more sad than those 
in the content condition (M = 3.16), p <.001, and significantly more sad than those in control 
condition (M = 2.96), p <.001. There were no significant differences in feeling sad between 
participants in the content and the control condition, p=.921. 
No significant main effect of condition was found for SAM arousal, F<1, suggesting that 
participants in the sad (M = 3.04), content (M = 3.44), and control (M = 3.58) conditions 





 Self-other overlap. No significant condition effect was found for self-other overlap, F<1, 
suggesting that participants in the sad (M = 5.46), content (M = 5.42), and control (M = 5.56) 
conditions reported similar levels of self-other overlap. 
 Helping. A one-way ANOVA with condition as the between-subjects factor was 
conducted on helping. A significant condition effect was found, F(2, 73) = 3.55, p=.034, 
η²=.089. Post-hoc tests indicated that participants in the sad condition (M = 4.96) were 
significantly less likely to help than those in the control condition (M = 5.92), p=.053, and 
marginally less likely to help those in the content condition (M = 5.88), p=.07. There was no 
significant difference between those in the content and control conditions, p=.994. 
Discussion 
The main hypothesis for Study 2 predicted that reflecting on a sad experience would not 
undermine self-other overlap, relative to reflecting on a content or neutral emotion because 
sadness does not elicit patterns of appraisals that attribute blame on human agency. Findings 
support the hypothesis; there was no significant condition effect for self-other overlap, 
suggesting reflecting on sadness, contentment, or control did not affect reports of self-other 
overlap with the close friend. Furthermore, the findings suggest that a valence perspective may 
not be as appropriate in the present paradigm as an appraisal tendency framework. Implications 
for theoretical contribution will be discussed later.  
Exploratory analyses regarding whether sadness would undermine helping were also 
conducted, and the results suggest that participants in the sadness condition reported significantly 
lower subsequent desire to help the close other than those in the control condition and marginally 
less desire to help those in the contentment condition. No significant difference in helping was 





A potential explanation for why sadness led to less helping, compared to the other 
conditions is that participants may have felt that helping would not be instrumental in improving 
their mood, which is one driver for why induced sadness typically leads to more helping in the 
first place (Manucia et al., 1984).  The sadness induction instructions specified participants to 
reflect on an experience that had already happened in the past. Furthermore, the prompt had 
given examples of potential events that cause interpersonal sadness to aid the recall of a specific 
event. These examples involved “being rejected by a friend, or feel depressed about something 
their friend has said or done.” The nature of the reflected event and the fact that it occurred in the 
past may contribute to the belief that helping the friend in a future scenario would not necessarily 
relieve the sadness one felt in the past.  In short, helping in a future event may be beyond the 
window of opportunity to change sadness from the past.   
More importantly, the findings suggest that the condition differences in helping cannot be 
explained by self-other overlap because there were no significant condition differences in self-
other overlap. Therefore participants who feel sad may be less likely to help their close other, 
compared to those who are content or more neutral, but this does not operate through the 
mediating role of self-other overlap.  
Study 2 found that the manipulation was effective in eliciting the desired emotion; 
participants reflecting on a past sad experience with a close friend, were significantly sadder and 
less happy than those asked to recall a past contentment experience or those asked to recall a 
neutral experience. There were no significant differences in sad or happy feeling between 
participants in the content and the control condition, though the means were in the predicted 
direction. 





Study 1 found that anger in relationships undermined self-other overlap with close friends 
to impede downstream prosocial tendencies toward that close friend, compared to happiness or a 
neutral emotion, while Study 2 found that similarly-valenced emotions like sadness and 
contentment did not undermine self-other overlap processes, relative to a neutral emotion. 
Supporting the appraisal tendency framework, these findings suggest that appraisals of other-
oriented agency can affect self-other overlap and helping, at least with negative emotions. What 
remains unclear is whether the other agency appraisal is asymmetric to negative emotions, 
wherein it shifts self-other overlap and helping among negative emotions only, or whether the 
other agency appraisal implicates self-other overlap and helping among positive emotions as 
well. Specifically, would a positive emotion associated with an other-oriented agency appraisal 
increase self-other overlap in close relationships? To test this question, Study 3 replaced the 
positive emotion condition with gratitude, a discrete emotion that is linked with other agency 
appraisals, and compared it to anger and a neutral control.  
Would Gratitude Increase Self-other Overlap and Helping? 
Gratitude involves an appraisal tendency that directly implicates close others. Gratitude 
usually occurs when an individual acknowledges another’s good deeds or prosocial behavior as 
providing a benefit for the self. It has been defined as ‘‘a sense of thankfulness and joy in 
response to receiving a gift, whether the gift be a tangible benefit from a specific other or a 
moment of peaceful bliss evoked by natural beauty’’ (Emmons, 2004, p. 554). Gratitude is 
considered a social emotion because young children learn to be grateful from role models, it 
involves the acknowledgment of another’s good deeds, affirms social resources, and motivates 
prosocial behavior (Emmons & Shelton, 2002) and the reciprocation of aid (Bartlett & DeSteno, 





gratitude when they appraise a positive event with other agency; in fact grateful people tend to 
believe other people are responsible for positive and desirable outcomes (Ellsworth & Smith, 
1988a; Emmons & McCullough, 2003; McCullough, Tsang, & Emmons, 2004; Ruth, Brunel, & 
Otnes, 2002; Soscia, 2007).   
Appraisal tendencies of gratitude may influence downstream judgment and decision 
making, especially judgments related to the self and other in relationships. For example, 
gratitude is related to more agreeableness and less narcissism (McCullough et al., 2001). 
Experimentally inducing gratitude within a negotiation context lowers self-concern, but increases 
other-concerns (Butt & Choi, 2006).   The induction of incidental gratitude, compared to 
incidental anger, also has consequences for downstream unrelated judgments, such as more trust 
and receptiveness to advice in an weight estimation task (Gino & Schweitzer, 2008). Relative to 
other positive emotions, gratitude motivates people to acknowledge the benefactor or repay for 
the positive deed, to spontaneously notice new positive traits in the benefactor, be more willing 
to associate with the benefactor in the future, and adopt a positive relationship focus toward the 
benefactor (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). In relationships, grateful feelings are associated with better 
perceptions of relationship quality, such as greater liking of or closeness to benefactor and 
feeling better understood by the benefactor (Algoe, Haidt, & Gable, 2008). Furthermore, 
evidence suggests that gratitude initiates relationship-building between the benefactor and the 
recipient, suggesting that it is important for relationship formation and maintenance (Algoe et al., 
2008). Taken together, the present study predicts that gratitude would increase self-other overlap 
in close relationships.  
How might gratitude implicate helping? Extant research generally supports the idea that 





(Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; Tsang, 2006, 2007), as well as unrelated others, even when it’s costly 
for the self (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006). People who are high on trait gratitude are rated by their 
social networks as more generous and helpful (McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002). Based on 
this, the present research predicts that gratitude would also increase helping, relative to the other 
conditions.  
Other Confounds 
Study 3 also addressed some limitations in Study 1. For example, an alternative 
explanation for anger’s detrimental effects in close relationships concerns a procedural confound, 
where participants identified a close friend as part of the emotion induction. The confound 
potentially allows participants in the angry condition to identify a friend with whom they initially 
shared lower self-other overlap, suggesting that anger’s effects on lower self-other overlap and 
helping, relative to the other conditions, may have emerged in part from reflecting on a friend 
who generally has lower self-other overlap with the self regardless of the emotion induction. A 
second and related limitation concerns the vague definition of what is considered a “close” 
friend, which could vary greatly depending on the participant, potentially contributing noise to 
the data. The vague definition of what constitutes a close friend allows for a broad pool of 
partners varying on self-other overlap from which to draw upon when reflecting on an emotional 
experience. Study 3 addressed these limitations by asking participants to identify their best friend 
prior to emotion induction instructions, and to reflect on the emotional experiences regarding this 
friend. The study also only recruited participants who were not married because married partners 
may be uniquely different from friends and may present a boundary condition, which was tested 






 Participants and procedures. 
Recruitment. Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk), an 
online crowdsourcing marketplace that allows researchers (known as requesters) to post jobs and 
participants (known as workers) to choose which jobs to complete. The marketplace has recently 
become popular among experimental psychologists, in part due to its efficiency in collecting data 
from human subjects, diverse sample, and low cost (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; 
Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013; Mason & Suri, 2012). Furthermore, research has 
replicated various cognitive behavioral tasks using a mTurk sample (e.g., Stroop, attentional 
blink, subliminal timing, etc.; Crump et al., 2013), suggesting that it is a validated tool for 
experimental behavioral research.  An mTurk study was posted for a “10-15-minute Psychology 
Study” with a payment of $0.50. mTurk allows requesters to limit the type of worker who could 
participate in a particular study based on specific qualifications. To ensure higher data quality 
and reduce noise, the study was limited to the workers with an approval rate of 95% or greater 
and those from the United States.  
Two hundred and fifty-six workers took part in the study (138 men, 106 women, 12 
gender unknown; mean age = 31.44 years, SD = 12.14 years). 
Exclusions. Fifty participants were excluded from analyses because they failed an 
instructional manipulation check designed to check negligence (see below for more details on the 
experiment checks). The percentage of exclusion based on this task was consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). 
Twenty-eight participants were deemed sufficiently distracted to be excluded from the 





writing a letter, etc.) based on a free-response question asking participants to describe the 
activities they were engaging in while they completed the study. 
Fifteen participants were excluded because they had identified a person other than their 
close friend (i.e., 3 participant identified their wife/husband, 3 work or academic colleague, and 
9 acquaintances). 
Six participants were excluded because they either gave illogical responses to the 
question, “Where were you when taking this survey?,” implying they were more negligent (i.e., 
October 18 2014, my friend, nothing, afternoon weekday, evening) or in a potentially distracting 
location (e.g., a pizza shop).   
 Although the study limited worker eligibility to only workers residing within the U.S., 
meaning that the study would not have been visible to workers from non-US countries, 
sometimes workers from non-US countries do end up participating in the study. As a second 
check of country residence, the IP address of each study participant was tracked for the country 
of origin using an online tracker. Seven participants’ IP addresses indicated that they resided 
outside of the U.S. (2 in Thailand,1 in Philippines, 1 in Singapore, 1 in Tanzania, 1 in Puerto 
Rico, and 1 in Belgium) and were excluded.  
 Taken together, the exclusions (41.41% of the original sample) consist of the following. 
The majority of the exclusions (32.81%) involved negligent participants (based on 19.53% 
instructional manipulation check, 10.94% self-reported distraction during study, and 2.34% 
negligent in answer a basic question). This percentage is consistent with experimental checks of 
negligence (e.g., 35% in Oppenheimer et al., 2009). The remaining exclusions consist of 5.86% 
participants who identified a partner who was not close friend and 2.73% were non US 





SD = 12.96 years) were included in the analyses.  The sample was 81.3% White/Caucasian, 5.3% 
Black/African American, 10.0% Asian, 1.3% Middle Eastern, and 1.3% Other.   
Unmarried participants screening.  Because married participants may be more likely to 
identify their marital partners as their best friend, presenting another confound and potential 
boundary condition, the study secretly screened for participants who are unmarried to better 
examine the relation between emotion and self-other overlap among close friends only. The 
screening task was designed to appear as a formality prior to the actual study and included a 
number of demographic distracter items (i.e., gender, race, ethnicity, race) as well as a question 
on current marital status. Participants were given 5 options for current marital status: 1) never 
married, 2) currently married, 3) separated, 4) divorced, and 5) widowed. Only participants who 
reported that they were never married, divorced, or widowed were forwarded to the actual study. 
All other participants (i.e., those who were currently married or separated) were notified that 
they were ineligible.   
Participants who passed the screening were informed that the present study explored 
feelings, memory, language, and visual spatial perception.  After giving their informed consent, 
participants were asked to identify and reflect on their best friend, and then were randomly 
assigned to either recall an angry, grateful, or neutral experience with that friend. They then 
reflected on the causes and reasons underlying their emotional experience for 30 seconds, and 
completed manipulation checks of valence and arousal. Participants then rated their level of self-
other overlap with their best friend in the experience and the degree to which they would help 
this friend. Participants were then debriefed and compensated. 
Identify partner. Participants were asked to think about their best friend and to take a 





the person’s initials. The task was designed to ensure that participants were indeed reflecting on 
their best friend as they were going through the emotion manipulation. 
Conditions. Participants were randomly assigned into one of three conditions in which 
they were asked to recall an angry, grateful, or neutral experience (control condition) with their 
best friend. See Appendix A for the verbatim instructions in each of the emotion manipulations. 
In the angry condition, participants were asked to recall a past experience in which they “felt 
angry at [friend’s initials].” The initials were collected during the partner identification and were 
automatically entered into the prompt. Participants were asked to “identify a specific experience 
…that makes [them] feel overwhelmed with anger when [they] think about it now” (n=49).  The 
instructions were fairly similar to that of Study 1, except that example anger scenarios were 
added to aid the recall of an event: “They may have felt angry because their friend treated them 
unfairly, or because their friend did or said something mean or inconsiderate.”  In the gratitude 
condition participants recalled an experience in which they “felt grateful because of [friend’s 
initials]” and to “identify a specific experience…that makes [them] feel overwhelmed with 
gratitude when [they] think about it now” (n=49). Examples of gratitude scenarios involved 
feeling “grateful because their friend helped them with something important, or because their 
friend supported them during a time of need.”  In the control condition, participants recalled an 
experience in which they “completed a daily activity with [friend’s initials].” The control 
scenarios were changed from previous studies to emphasize activities that adult friends may do 
together (e.g., “simply going about their daily activities with their friend, such as walking or 
driving somewhere, waiting in line, or watching TV to just pass some time”) to reflect the older 
non-student mTurk population. They were told to “identify a specific experience ….that makes 





participants were instructed to reflect on the causes and reasons underlying the thoughts 
and feelings they experienced during the recalled experience for 30 seconds.  
 Manipulation checks. Self-assessment manikin (SAM, Bradley & Lang, 1994) was 
assessed to evaluate participants’ valence and arousal to the recalled experience like in previous 
studies from 1 (unhappy/calm) to 9(happy/excited), respectively: valence (M = 5.93, SD = 1.93); 
arousal (M = 3.77, SD = 2.04).  
 Self-other overlap. Participants completed the same trait measure of self-other overlap 
as Study 1 and 2, where they rated themselves and the other person on 15 randomly presented 
traits (e.g., athletic, intelligent, creative, etc.) on a scale from 1(not at all characteristic of me) to 
3 (somewhat characteristic of me / the other person) to 7 (extremely characteristic of me / the 
other person). The final self-other overlap variable followed the same calculation process; M = 
5.55, SD = 0.60. 
 Helping.  Helping was measured by the same measure used in Studies 1 and 2, where 
participants were asked to imagine that their close friend had been evicted from his or her 
apartment and rate which of the seven present options they would do to help their friend, e.g., 
from 1) I would do nothing to 7) I would offer to let the person come live with me rent free 
(provided I had the space; M = 5.87, SD = 1.22).   
 Experiment checks.  
Identified friend. Because the study asked participants to identify a best friend to reflect 
upon during the emotion manipulation, presumably participants should have thought about their 
close friend. Whether this was the case was checked again at the end of the study. Participants 
answered the question: “The person you had previously identified is:” by selecting one of the 6 





romantic partner or work or academic colleague, 4) a work or academic colleague, 5) an 
acquaintance, 6) a near stranger. Only participants who selected that they had reflected on their 
close friend or girlfriend/boyfriend were included in the analyses.  
Instructional manipulation check. At the end of the study, participants completed an 
instructional manipulation check that was designed to identify negligent participants. Inclusion 
of an IMC has been shown to increase statistical power and reliability of the data in offline 
studies (Oppenheimer et al., 2009), as well as benefit online studies involving mTurk participants 
that require more time (~16 minutes; Goodman et al., 2013).  Because the original version of the 
IMC asked about “sports participation” which is unrelated to the study and may arouse 
suspicion, the question was modified to focus on internet activities. Participants were presented 
with instructions that asked “In order to facilitate our research we are interested in knowing 
certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to 
read the directions. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read these instructions, please 
select online shopping and check email only below and then click to the next screen. Thank you 
very much.” Then in a clearly demarcated paragraph, the instructions asked “Which of these 
Internet activities do you engage in regularly? (Select all that apply),” followed by a list of 
common internet activities (i.e., read the news online, check email, twitter, facebook, tumblr, 
blogger, pinterest, instagram, online shopping, other(please specify).” Only participants who 
followed the instructions correctly by selecting “online shopping” and “check email” were 
included in the analyses. 
 Distractions. Distractions were checked with two questions at the end of the study. First, 
participants were asked “Where were you when taking this survey?” Then they were also asked 






 Manipulation checks. Two separate one-way ANOVA’s with condition as a between-
subjects factor were conducted on SAM valence and SAM arousal. All significant condition 
effects were followed by post-hoc tests using a Tukey HSD correction (see Table II.2). A 
significant main effect of condition on SAM valence, F(2, 147) = 29.45, p <.001, η²=.286, 
indicated that participants in the angry condition (M = 4.49) were significantly less happy than 
those in the gratitude condition (M = 6.90), p<.001, and significantly less happy than those in 
control condition (M = 6.38), p<.001. There were no significant differences in feeling happy 
between participants in the gratitude and control condition, p=.261, though the means were in the 
predicted direction.  
A significant main effect of condition on SAM arousal, F(2, 147) = 3.14, p =.05, η²=.041, 
indicated that participants in the gratitude condition (M = 4.24) were significantly more aroused 
than those in the control condition (M = 3.25), p =.038. There were no significant differences in 
arousal between participants in the gratitude and the angry condition (M = 3.86), p =.608, nor 
between participants in the angry condition and control condition, p =.288.  
 Self-other overlap. A one-way ANOVA with condition as the between-subjects factor 
was conducted on self-other overlap. There was a significant condition effect, F(2, 147) = 3.21, 
p=.043, η²=.042. Post-hoc tests indicated that participants in the angry condition (M = 5.41) had 
significantly less self-other overlap than those in the control condition (M = 5.71), p=.035. There 
were no significant mean differences in self-other overlap between participants in the angry and 
gratitude condition (M = 5.53), p=.583, though the means were in the predicted direction. No 
significant mean differences in self-other overlap between participants in the gratitude and 





 Helping. No significant condition effect was found for helping, F(2, 147) = 1.01, p=.368, 
η²=.014, suggesting that participants in the angry (M = 5.96), grateful (M = 5.98), and control (M 
= 5.67) conditions reported similar levels of helping. 
Discussion 
 Study 3 replicated the effect that anger in close friendships undermined self-other 
overlap, relative to a neutral emotion, even after controlling for the level of initial self-other 
overlap by having participants reflect on their best friend prior to the emotion induction.  
Specifically, reflecting on a past anger experience involving a best friend led to significantly 
lower inclusion of mental representations of that friend into the individual’s own mental 
representations, compared to reflecting on a past neutral experience.  
 However, anger did not undermine helping, relative to the neutral control in this better 
controlled sample. The findings suggest that the mediation model where anger undermined self-
other overlap to undermine helping may be unreliable. Future research should explore the role of 
anger on helping more to fully explore the model among other contexts and populations. 
 Interestingly, reflecting on a grateful experience did not elicit significantly different 
levels of self-other overlap than reflecting on anger nor a neutral emotion. In fact, the means for 
gratitude on self-other overlap were not in the predicted direction. Participants in the gratitude 
condition reported self-other overlap levels that were in between those in the angry and control 
conditions. Gratitude also did not elicit greater levels of helping than the other conditions, 
suggesting that it did not replicate previous research linking gratitude with greater helping 
(Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; Tsang, 2006, 2007).  
 However, the lack of significant differences between gratitude and the other conditions 





not measured directly, which in hindsight poses a limitation, interpretation will have to rely on 
post-manipulation valence scores in assessing the effectiveness of the gratitude manipulation. 
Although participants in the angry condition were less happy than those in both the gratitude and 
the control condition, participants in the gratitude condition did not report greater levels of 
happiness than those in the control, though the means were in the predicted direction and the 
effect can be considered trending. This suggest that perhaps the manipulation did not effectively 
manipulate gratitude, relative to the control condition, and this may be a function of issues with 
power. Another interpretation suggests that participants in the control condition were still mildly 
happy, once again highlighting the difficulty in eliciting a truly neutral control in close 
relationships. Most likely, both interpretations may apply: perhaps Study 3 had difficulty in 
effectively manipulating an intensely grateful experience and a truly neutral emotion. 
Study 4: Anger Versus Gratitude and Control Among Marital Partners 
Both Studies 1 and 3 found that anger experiences may be especially detrimental in close 
friendship relationships, because anger undermines the process of including mental 
representations of that close friend into the self, relative to a more neutral emotion condition. 
Study 4 seeks to test this effect in another type of relationship, by exploring whether it would 
still operate in relationships characterized by stronger and perhaps more enduring self-other 
overlap, such as marital couples. I hypothesize that marital couples, like close friendships, would 
exhibit momentary fluctuations in self-other overlap processes in response to anger, relative to 
the other conditions, because anger could carry over into social-cognitive judgments related to 
the self and other. This hypothesis is supported by theory and research from the appraisal 
tendency framework (Han et al., 2007; Keltner et al., 2006; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; 





suggesting that anger undermines self-other overlap relative to the control among close 
friendships.  
Study 4 examined how anger may operate among married participants reflecting on past 
emotional experiences with their marital partner. It was ran concurrently with Study 3 on mTurk, 
so the two studies share a similar procedure.  Participants in Study 4 were screened for marital 
status, asked to identify their marital partner, randomly assigned to reflect on an anger, grateful, 
or neutral control experience with their marital partner, and then to report self-other overlap and 
helping toward their marital partner.  
Method 
 Participants and procedures. 
Recruitment. Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk). An 
mTurk study was posted for a “10-15-minute Psychology Study” with a payment of $1. Like in 
the previous mTurk study, Study 4 was limited to the workers with an approval rate of 95% or 
greater and those from the United States. One hundred and fifty workers took part in the study 
(53 men, 97 women; mean age = 38.29 years, SD = 12 years). 
Exclusions. Twelve participants who failed the instructional manipulation check were 
excluded from analyses.  
Based on the distraction question, 12 people were deemed sufficiently distracted enough 
to be excluded from the study (e.g., watching TV or listening to music, talking to their children, 
etc.).  
Four people were excluded because they had identified a person other than their married 
partner (i.e., 1 participant identified a work or academic colleague, 1 participant a close friend 





Four participants were excluded from the analyses because their IP addressed indicated 
that they did not reside in the U.S. (2 participants resided in Mexico, 1 in Romania, and 1 in the 
Philippines).  
 Taken together, the exclusions (21.33% of the original sample) consist of the following. 
The majority of the exclusions (16%) involved negligent participants (based on 8% instructional 
manipulation check and 8% self-reported distraction during study). The remaining exclusions 
consist of 2.67% participants who identified a partner who was not their marital partner and 
2.67% were non US participants.4 After the exclusions, 118 participants (42 men, 76 women; 
mean age = 39.54 years, SD = 11.95 years) were included in the analyses.  The sample was 
88.1% White/Caucasian, 5.1% Black/African American, 2.5% Asian, 0.8% American 
Indian/Alaskan Native, and 3.4% Other.   
Married participants screening.  To better control for closeness level to the relationship 
partner, the study secretly screened for marital status. Using the same screening task as in Study 
3, participants were presented with 5 options for current marital status: 1) never married, 2) 
currently married, 3) separated, 4) divorced, and 5) widowed. Only participants who reported to 
be currently married were forwarded to the actual study, whereas the remaining workers were 
notified that they were ineligible. Participants who passed the screening followed similar 
procedures as those in Study 3.  
 Identify partner. Participants were asked to think about their current romantic partner 
(e.g., wife or husband) and to take a few moments to imagine that person in front of them right 
now. They were then asked to enter the person’s initials. The task was designed to ensure that 






 Conditions. Participants were randomly assigned into one of three conditions in which 
they were asked to recall an angry, grateful, or neutral experience (control condition) with their 
relationship partner. See Appendix A for the verbatim instructions in each of the emotion 
manipulations. In the angry condition, participants were asked to recall a past experience in 
which they “felt angry at this person” and to “identify a specific experience …that makes [them] 
feel overwhelmed with anger when [they] think about it now” (n=33).  The same example anger 
scenarios were presented as those from Study 3 to aid the recall of an event (e.g., “their partner 
treated them unfairly, or … did or said something mean or inconsiderate”).  In the gratitude 
condition participants recalled an experience in which they “felt grateful because of this person” 
and to “identify a specific experience…that makes [them] feel overwhelmed with gratitude when 
[they] think about it now” (n=42). The same example gratitude scenarios were presented as those 
from Study 3 (e.g., “their partner helped them with something important, or… supported them 
during a time of need”).  In the control condition, participants recalled an experience in which 
they “completed a daily activity with this person…such as shopping for groceries, doing laundry 
or dishes, or cleaning the house” and to “identify a specific experience ….that makes [them] feel 
neutral when [they] think about it now” (n=43).  After recalling the experience, participants were 
instructed to reflect on the causes and reasons underlying the thoughts and feelings they 
experienced during the recalled experience for 30 seconds.  
 Manipulation checks. Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM, Bradley & Lang, 1994) was 
assessed to evaluate participants’ valence and arousal to the recalled experience like in previous 
studies from 1 (unhappy/calm) to 9(happy/excited), respectively: valence (M = 5.57, SD = 2.03); 





 Self-other overlap. Participants completed the same trait measure of self-other overlap, 
where they rated themselves and the other person on 15 randomly presented traits (e.g., athletic, 
intelligent, creative, etc.) on a scale from 1(not at all characteristic of me) to 3 (somewhat 
characteristic of me / the other person) to 7 (extremely characteristic of me / the other person). 
The final self-other overlap variable followed the same calculation process; M = 5.52, SD = 0.55. 
 Helping. Helping was measured by two questions that reflect high-cost helping scenarios 
commonly used in the prosocial behavior literature (Curry, Roberts, & Dunbar, 2013; Fitzgerald, 
Thompson, & Whitaker, 2010; Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2007). These questions were 
chosen because they may be more appropriate for married partners than the eviction helping 
scenario because married participants are presumably living with their partners and because 
high-cost scenarios may reduce the chance of obtaining a ceiling effect. Participants were asked 
to imagine that the person they had identified needs a kidney transplant and to indicate how 
likely they would be to donate a kidney to this person. They were then asked to imagine that the 
person is trapped in a burning house and to indicate how likely they would be to rescue this 
person. Both questions involved choices from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 9 (extremely likely), 
Mkidney = 8.40, SDkidney = 1.45; Mhouse = 8.69, SDhouse = 1.00; r = .42, p<.01.  They were averaged 
into one index of helping, Mboth = 8.54, SDboth = 1.04.  
 Experiment checks. 
Identified married partner. Because the study previously screened participants who are 
married and asked them to identify their current romantic partner to reflect upon for the emotion 
manipulation, presumably participants should have thought about their wife or husband. Whether 
participants actually reflected on their marital partner was checked again at the end of the study. 





on of the 6 options: 1) my wife/husband, 2) my girlfriend/boyfriend, 3) a close friend who is not 
my romantic partner, 4) a work or academic colleague, 5) an acquaintance, 6) a near stranger. 
Only participants who selected that they had reflected on their wife/husband were included in the 
analyses.  
Instructional manipulation check. At the end of the study, participants completed the 
same instructional manipulation check as the one from Study 3. The IMC was designed to 
identify negligent participants, and inclusion of it has been shown to increase statistical power 
and reliability of the data (IMC; Oppenheimer et al., 2009).   
 Distractions. Distractions were checked with two questions at the end of the study. First, 
participants were asked “Where were you when taking this survey?” Then they were also asked 
to describe the activities they were engaging in while they completed the survey.  
Results 
 Manipulation checks. Two separate one-way ANOVA’s with condition as a between-
subjects factor were conducted on SAM valence and SAM arousal. All significant condition 
effects were followed by post-hoc tests using a Tukey HSD correction (see Table II.2). A 
significant main effect of condition on SAM valence, F(2, 115) = 39.66, p <.001, η²=.408, 
indicated that participants in the angry condition (M = 3.70) were significantly less happy than 
those in the gratitude condition (M = 6.95), p<.001, and significantly less happy than those in 
control condition (M = 5.65), p <.001. Participants in the gratitude condition were significantly 
more happy than those in the control condition, p<.001.  
A significant main effect of condition on SAM arousal, F(2, 115) = 7.06, p =.001, 
η²=.109, indicated that participants in the angry condition (M = 5.06) were significantly more 





than those in control condition (M = 3.63), p =.003. There were no significant differences in 
arousal between participants in the gratitude and the control condition, p=.999. 
 Self-other overlap.  No significant condition effect was found for self-other overlap, 
F(2, 115) = 1.31, p=.274 η²=.022, suggesting that participants in the angry (M = 5.40), grateful 
(M = 5.52), and control (M = 5.61) conditions reported similar levels of self-other overlap. 
Helping.  No significant condition effect was found for helping, F(2, 114) = 1.42, 
p=.246, η²=.024, suggesting that participants in the angry (M = 8.30), grateful (M = 8.70), and 
control (M = 8.57) conditions reported similar levels of helping. 
Discussion 
Study 4 tested the boundary conditions of anger’s effect in undermining self-other 
overlap. Specifically the present study hypothesized that reflecting on an anger would undermine 
self-other overlap among married participants, relative to the other conditions. Participants were 
screened for marital status and asked to reflect on an angry, grateful, and neutral emotion. Study 
4 found that there were no significant differences in self-other overlap among the 3 emotion 
conditions, suggesting that married participants reported similar levels in self-other overlap 
regardless of whether they reflected on an angry, grateful, or neutral emotion control experience 
with their marital partner.  
The findings, although initially surprising, have interesting implications for the shifting 
nature of self-other overlap. The findings suggest that marital relationships may be one boundary 
condition for the effect of anger in undermining self-other overlap and that interpersonal 
emotions may not as readily shift overlapping mental representations among married people. 
Examining the means suggests that the effect cannot be explained by a ceiling effect; after all, 





implication of the findings is that perhaps self-other overlap processes among married couples 
are more enduring and resistant to momentary shifts of emotion, compared to people from other 
relationship groups. The null finding may have occurred because marital partners have already 
merged and solidified the mental representations of the self and other over time, making these 
representations more resistant to shifts from momentary factors within the relationship. Theory 
and research suggests that self-other overlap changes typically occur in the form of rapid self-
expansion during the initial stages of relationship development (Aron & Aron, 1996; Aron, 
McLaughlin-Volpe, et al., 2004; Aron, Paris, & Aron, 1995), but slow in more long-term 
relationships that offer fewer opportunities for self-expansion or as marital boredom sets in 
(Aron & Aron, 1996). As marital partners witness their partner in a variety of contexts across 
time, they gain a better understanding of the other person and therefore may form enduring 
mental representations of them. Furthermore, the process of including others into the self may 
have slowed to the extent to which the self and other have become merged into the one’s own 
self-concept.  That could explain why relationship dissolution is emotionally distressing and 
predicts self-concept confusion (Slotter et al., 2010), manifesting in statements like ‘‘I don’t 
know who I am anymore’’ (Haber, 1990), or people reporting that they have ‘‘lost part of 
themselves,’’ or that they feel ‘‘incomplete as a person’’ in counselling settings (Mika & Bloom, 
1981). Relationship dissolution is considered a rapid self-constriction in which the self loses a 
major source of identity, resources, and perspectives that was formerly a part of the self (Aron, 
McLaughlin-Volpe, et al., 2004). Given that anger does not undermine self-other overlap, 
relative to the other conditions, among marital partners, one conclusion is that marital partners 
have more stable mental representations of self and others that are more resistant to momentary 





could influence this, such as the extent to which marital partners are happy in their relationships. 
Perhaps among unhappy spouses, self-other overlap shifts may occur more readily after 
reflecting on an anger experience.  
The manipulation was effective in eliciting the desired emotion. Participants in the angry 
condition were less happy than those in the gratitude and control conditions. Furthermore 
participants in the gratitude condition were significantly happier than those in the control 
condition, suggesting that Study 4 was more effective in manipulating gratitude and a more 
neutral emotion control. This also suggests that the null effects in self-other overlap cannot be 
explained by the difficulty in manipulating the desired emotion. 
Like in Study 3, Study 4 failed to replicate the condition effect on helping. This may have 
been a result of a ceiling effect of helping among married partners; in general participants in all 3 
conditions were overwhelmingly willing to help their married partner (e.g., donating kidney, or 
saving partner from burning house).   
General Discussion 
 Across 4 studies, Chapter II explored the role that emotion plays in momentarily shifting 
self-other overlap in close relationships. Reflecting on an anger experience with a close or best 
friend impaired downstream judgments of self-other overlap, relative to reflecting on a more 
neutral emotion, suggesting that anger could carry over into judgments of overlapping mental 
representations of self and other (Studies 1 and 3). Furthermore, the significant differences 
between anger and happiness in self-other overlap (Study 1), discrete emotions that maximally 
differ on an appraisal of other agency, suggest that other agency account for the effects of 
emotion for self-other overlap. Pitting an appraisal tendency framework against a valence 





support that other agency appraisal may be one key appraisal that explains the effect, at least 
with negative emotions. The present research, however, did not effectively test whether other 
agency appraisals among positive emotions may operate similarly among close friendships, 
because it did not fully manipulate gratitude, relative to a more neutral control (Study 3). 
However, gratitude was effectively manipulated, relative to the other conditions, among marital 
couples (Study 4), but the study found null effects of condition for self-other overlap and 
helping, suggesting that an other agency appraisal among positive emotions does not influence 
self-other overlap among this particular sample. Future research should explore more effective 
means of manipulating gratitude relative to a neutral control among close friendships to test 
whether other agency is one key appraisal that shifts self-other overlap among both negative and 
positive emotions, or whether the effect of other agency is asymmetric to negative emotions 
only.  
Examining the research questions among marital partners indicates that the negative 
effects of anger on self-other overlap, relative to a more neutral control, does not apply to 
married participants reflecting on their romantic partners (Study 4). This boundary condition 
cannot be explained by a ceiling effect, meaning that married couples are not simply rating 
themselves and their partners as very high in overlapping mental representations; instead married 
couples may face a boundary condition because their judgments of self-other overlap may be 
more resistant to momentary shifts from anger. This is an idea that could be more fully examined 
in future research, for example, by examining whether couples who have been together longer or 
who report more stable and satisfying relationships are less susceptible to anger influencing their 





 Anger undermined self-other overlap in close friendships, relative to a more neutral 
emotion (Study 1), and this was replicated in a subsequent study (Study 3). Particular aspects of 
anger specifically may have led to its interference in judgments of self-other overlap. Evidence 
from appraisal theories of anger suggests that anger is associated with appraisals that the other 
person poses a threat to self-esteem (Baumeister et al., 1996; Kernis et al., 1989; C. A. Smith & 
Lazarus, 1993), caused the situation (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Fischer, 1991; Frijda, 1986; 
Ortony et al., 1988; C. A. Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Wierzbicka, 1992), and creates obstacles to 
achieving one’s goals (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Izard, 1977; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  
Therefore, anger in certain relationships may create lower levels of self-other overlap 
because it is associated with appraisals that blame and perhaps vilify the other person, therefore 
interfering with the downstream judgments about whether to incorporate mental representations 
from the other person into those of the self.  Furthermore, the relationship between anger and 
lower self-other overlap may be better explained by the appraisal patterns of anger than by 
valence. This findings are in accordance with the emerging literature suggesting a valence 
framework alone cannot explain the effects of emotion on judgments (e.g., DeSteno, Petty, 
Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Keltner et al., 1993; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). This prior research 
upholds the idea that appraisal tendencies may present a more nuanced framework for research 
on emotions and self-other overlap than a strictly valence-based approach. Because the 
experience of anger is not the same as the experience of sadness, averaging them into one index 
of negative emotion may involve a level of analysis that is too simple. Most importantly, the 
findings suggest that theory on the social-cognitive consequences of emotion for self-other 





on particular cognitive dimensions, such as other agency, may be one fruitful avenue for further 
exploration.  
Anger’s effect on the overlapping mental representations is probably a more unconscious 
process. For one, some theorists believe that the overlapping mental representations factor of 
self-other overlap is not as directly accessible to people (Myers & Hodges, 2012), suggesting that 
it may be a less conscious construct. The measure of overlapping mental representations assesses 
traits or attributes of the self and other separately, making it more difficult for participants to be 
aware of the construct being assessed. Also, the traits were presented randomly to participants, 
further promoting unconscious processing of judgments. Secondly, self-other overlap was not 
assessed directly in relation to the anger experience. Theory and research on appraisal tendency 
framework argue that appraisal tendencies carryover to judgment and decisions through less 
conscious incidental emotional influences, and these carryover effects may be deactivated when 
an individual becomes aware of his or her own judgment and choice processes (Han et al., 2007). 
One direction for future research could be to examine whether awareness of anger’s role in 
relationships could interrupt anger’s effect in undermining self-other overlap. For example, one 
interesting question is whether marital partners are more aware of how anger influences negative 
judgments of their marital partner, therefore providing a potential alternative explanation for why 
anger does not undermine their self-other overlap with that partner. Future directions should 
unpack these two constructs to better understand anger’s role in influencing self-other overlap.  
One potential limitation of the findings is that the studies did not measure appraisals 
directly. However, because of the overwhelming evidence linking the discrete emotions to their 
respective appraisal patterns, assessing appraisals in the studies may create more harm than 





processes under exploration by directing participants’ attention to how the appraisal (e.g., other 
responsibility) may affect ratings of others and themselves. This awareness of judgment and 
choice processes may deactivate the carryover effects of discrete emotions (Han et al., 2007). As 
such, research situated within the appraisal tendency framework typically does not directly 
assess appraisals within their experimental paradigm (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lerner et al., 
2004). 
The present research only examined the ways in which anger could undermine self-other 
overlap. The finding, however, does not preclude the possibility that anger could also build self-
other overlap, which could occur by shifting the other-agency component of anger. The present 
research found that the other-agency component of anger may be the explanatory appraisal 
tendency that affects downstream judgments of self and other. Shifting anger’s other-agency to 
perhaps a third-party agency would be one interesting line of research for future directions. Said 
simply, the experience of being angry at a close partner is different than that of both the self and 
close partner being angry at a third party who is responsible for the anger-eliciting event. 
Potential strategic interventions for anger in close relationships may involve shifting anger 
toward a third-party or circumstantial agency being responsible for the anger eliciting event. Past 
research on conflict resolution and intergroup behavior among social groups suggest that 
refocusing the conflicting groups on more superordinate goals may be effective in reducing 
conflict, at least among groups (Sherif, White, & Harvey, 1955). 
The present research also examined downstream consequences of shifting self-other 
overlap, by testing mediation models where anger undermined self-other overlap to affect 
subsequent helping in close relationships, relative to the other conditions. Specifically, Study 1 





helping in close friendships, relative to the other conditions, through the mediating role of self-
other overlap. However, subsequent tests of this model failed to replicate the findings from Study 
1, because of a failure to replicate the effect of anger in undermining helping in close friendships 
(Study 3) or because of a ceiling effect of helping among married couples (Study 4). Therefore, 
the particular pathway from which anger undermines self-other overlap to undermine subsequent 
helping may be an unreliable model and future research should examine the model more fully 
among different contexts and populations. 
One limitation of the study is that the helping measure is self-reported measure instead of 
an actual behavioral measure. Self-report measures of helping may be more vulnerable to social 
desirability and self-presentation concerns. This may be evident in the ceiling effect in helping 
found among marital partners (Study 4). Of course marital partners may have truly desired to 
help their partners, but they may also have been answering in a socially desirable way. Future 
research should examine the mediating role of self-other overlap in anger and more covert 
measures of helping that do not suffer the same vulnerabilities as self-report measures.    
In all 4 studies, the positive emotion condition and the control condition elicited similar 
levels of self-other overlap and helping. Specifically, the positive emotion condition (regardless 
whether it was happiness, contentment, or gratitude) did not differ significantly from the control 
condition in both self-other overlap and in the desire to help. This finding contradicts previous 
research and the present research hypotheses where the induction of more positive emotions 
would lead to more helping, compared to the control. One interpretation of the null findings 
points to the difficulty with distinguishing the positive emotion condition and the control 
condition.  Examinations of the post-manipulation emotion checks suggest that in Study 1, 





who were in the control condition. Therefore the happy and control condition did elicit 
differences in emotion, albeit only marginally. In Studies 2 and 3, there were no significant 
differences in feeling happy between participants in the positive emotion condition (whether 
contentment or gratitude) and the control condition, though they were in the predicted direction. 
In Study 4, participants in the gratitude condition were significantly happier than those in the 
control condition, though as previously discussed, marital relationships may be the boundary 
condition for the effect of emotion on self-other overlap and there was a ceiling effect of helping. 
The similar levels of post-manipulation emotion between the positive emotion and control 
conditions in Studies 2 and 3 could have been partially affected by the fact that it is difficult to 
induce a truly neutral control in relationships in which positive emotions dominate. Future 
research would need to improve the instructions of control condition to improve its ability to 
induce a more neutral experience, or future researchers may want to exclude a neutral control 
condition altogether. 
The present set of studies precludes other aspects of emotions in influencing self-other 
overlap and helping. For one, arousal, along with valence, has historically been an interesting 
dimension that differentiates emotions (Russell, Lewicka, & Niit, 1989). According to the 
Circumplex Model, different emotions may be plotted along two axes, the arousal dimension on 
the vertical axis and the valence dimension on the horizontal axis, to allow the distribution of the 
emotions in a two-dimensional circular space (Russell et al., 1989).  In the model, anger and 
happiness from Study 1 are considered higher in arousal than sadness and contentment from 
Study 2. Consideration of the arousal dimensions by merging the two studies would allow a more 
thorough examination of how the arousal dimension of emotions affects self-other overlap and 





versus low arousal (sadness, contentment) emotions on self-other overlap and helping suggest 
that both did not differ by arousal.5 Furthermore, tests of arousal by valence interactions on self-
other overlap formally replicated the significant difference between angry versus happiness in 
Study 1 and the lack of significant differences between sadness and contentment in Study 2 for 
self-other overlap. Lastly, there were no valence by arousal interactions on helping, suggesting 
that arousal does not implicate prosocial tendencies in close relationships.  Although sadness has 
been traditionally considered a low arousal emotion, extreme sadness could be highly arousing; 
furthermore the emotion prompts urged participants to identify extreme experiences that were 
overwhelming. Examining the post-manipulation arousal levels found no condition effect on 
arousal in both studies for both sadness and contentment, suggesting that arousal was not 
elicited, relative to a neutral control. Also, examining the means for all the emotion conditions in 
Studies 1 and 2 suggest that they were relatively neutral in arousal. Therefore, although sadness 
or contentment could have been highly arousing, this was not the case for the present studies. 
Taken together, the present research suggests that the arousal dimension of emotion is not 
implicated in self-other overlap or helping.  
One alternative interpretation suggests that anger undermines self-other overlap because 
participants in the angry condition are simply judging the close other in less positive terms, 
relative to other conditions. This assertion is in part driven by the fact that the measure of self-
other overlap includes only positive attributes or traits, suggesting that greater endorsement of 
the traits as characteristic of the self or other actually implies more positive ratings of the self or 
other. The present research tested this argument by examining the effect of condition on self and 
other ratings separately in several exploratory analyses.6 Across the 3 studies where angry and 





positively they rated themselves or how positively they rated the close others, controlling for the 
effect of sample. Furthermore, within the angry condition, the experience of positive (relative to 
negative) emotion, as measured by the SAM valence after the emotion induction, was not 
associated with how positively participants rated the self or close other. Therefore, anger’s effect 
on self-other overlap cannot be explained by participants in the angry condition simply rating the 
close other as having less positive traits.  
  In conclusion, the present chapter explored the causal role that emotions play in 
momentarily shifting self-other overlap and the boundary conditions for this process. Anger 
toward close others may be one factor that can momentarily shift self-other overlap among close 
friendships, but not among marital relationships. Furthermore, adopting a more nuanced 
appraisal framework may be a more fruitful pursuit for future research on the effect of discrete 
emotion and self-other overlap than a strictly valence-based framework. More research is needed 
to examine the role of positive emotions, specifically, gratitude, on self-other overlap processes 










Does Self-other Overlap Moderate the Consequences of Prosocial Behavior? 
This dissertation aims to uncover the relationship between self-other overlap and 
prosocial behavior in close relationships. Chapter II explored the research topic within an 
experimental context to uncover whether discrete emotions shift self-other overlap in the 
moment, and whether shifts in self-other overlap would affect downstream prosocial tendencies. 
Chapter III builds and extends upon research on the relationship between self-other overlap and 
prosocial behavior in close relationships by exploring whether self-other overlap moderates the 
consequences of prosocial behavior over time from a longitudinal lifespan perspective. Guided 
by research and theory from a variety of literatures, the present research argues that giving to 
emotionally close others (i.e., others who overlap highly with the self) would predict pronounced 
long-term health benefits for the self, whereas giving to less close others may not. This 
hypothesis is supported by converging research and theory on the benefits of prosocial behavior 
for mental and physical health, the stress-regulating benefits of the caregiving system for long-
term health outcomes, the nature of hierarchical communal relationships as a proxy for emotional 
closeness, and the health benefits of parenting.  
Prosocial Behavior Implicates Physical Health and Mortality Risk 
Previous research has discovered a host of health benefits from giving to others. Giving 
support is associated with fewer health conditions, lower blood pressure, lower viral loads in 





Brown et al., 2003; W. M. Brown, Consedine, & Magai, 2005; Ironson, 2007; Ironson et al., 
2002; McClellan et al., 1993; Piferi & Lawler, 2006; Schwartz, Keyl, Marcum, & Bode, 2009). 
Experimental studies point to mechanisms within the neuroendocrine system: giving support 
decreases givers’ cortisol, a stress hormone (Field, Hernandez-Reif, Quintino, Schanberg, & 
Kuhn, 1998; A. M. Smith, Loving, Crockett, & Campbell, 2009), and increases progesterone and 
oxytocin, social bonding hormones (S. L. Brown, Konrath, Seng, & Smith, 2011). Perhaps the 
definitive health outcome associated with giving behavior is that of a reduced mortality risk. 
Previous research suggests that providing support to others predicts lower mortality risk (S. L. 
Brown et al., 2003; McClellan et al., 1993). However, research has not examined how the 
association between giving and lower mortality risk may differ by targets varying on emotional 
closeness, and whether giving to one’s children may predict reduced mortality risk compared to 
giving to other people.  
Caregiving System 
Why would giving to others varying in emotional closeness differentially affect health 
outcomes? Supporting evidence may be found in the theoretical model of caregiving and health, 
which argues that i) giving to others could benefit one’s own health to the extent that giving 
engages a biological caregiving system and ii) this caregiving system may be moderated by 
relationship variables, such as emotional closeness (Konrath & Brown, 2013). 
Health implications of caregiving system. The caregiving system is a pattern of 
emotions, cognitions, and neurophysiology that has evolved to promote and maintain the 
formation of social bonds and to motivate helping (S. L. Brown, Brown, et al., 2011; S. L. 
Brown & Brown, 2006). The model of caregiving and motivation posits a pathway in which cues 





consequence, stress-regulation (Konrath & Brown, 2013). Rooted in maternal caregiving neural 
circuitry, the caregiving system directs maternal motivation in response to salient need of others 
(S. L. Brown, Brown, et al., 2011; S. L. Brown & Brown, 2006; Numan, 2006) by either 
increasing the motivation to help (i.e., approach motivation) or decreasing the avoidance of harm 
to the self (i.e., avoidance motivation; Numan, 2006).  
Most importantly, the model of caregiving and health posits that the caregiving system 
may elicit downstream physical and psychological health benefits through its stress-regulating 
functions (Konrath & Brown, 2013). Specifically, when responding to cues of need from others, 
the caregiving system activates neuroprotective hormones like oxytocin and progesterone (S. L. 
Brown et al., 2009), which are released in both human parents during parent-infant interactions 
as well as in animal maternal behavior (Feldman, Gordon, Schneiderman, Weisman, & Zagoory-
Sharon, 2010; Numan, 2006). Furthermore, hormones released in the caregiving system, such as 
oxytocin and progesterone, serve important neuroprotective functions that could benefit long-
term health outcomes the self. For example, progesterone released in response to cortisol could 
operate as a down-regulating mechanism that promotes long-term coping (Wirth & Schultheiss, 
2006). Oxytocin has also been shown to interact with the presence of social support to provide 
pronounced stress-regulation during a stressful speech task; among this sample, male participants 
who were administered oxytocin (vs. placebo) and given social support from a friend (vs. no 
support) had the lowest cortisol response during the stressful speech (Heinrichs, Baumgartner, 
Kirschbaum, & Ehlert, 2003).  Therefore, the caregiving system may elicit downstream health 
benefits via stress-buffering mechanisms.  
The moderating role of emotional closeness may favor children. The model of 





caregiving motivation is elicited, which would affect downstream health outcomes (Konrath & 
Brown, 2013). The present research examines one particular relationship variable of interest: 
emotional closeness, a factor underlying psychological concept of self-other overlap.  The 
impetus for this approach is supported by the model of caregiving and health, which argues the 
stress-regulating benefits of prosocial behavior may be more pronounced when giving to others 
who are emotionally closer or perceived as more interdependent to the self (Konrath & Brown, 
2013). Further supporting this idea, experimental manipulation of emotional closeness among 
humans has been found to activate hormones commonly released in the caregiving system (e.g., 
salivary progesterone; S. L. Brown et al., 2009).  
The role of caregiving motivation in promoting downstream health outcomes may be 
more pronounced among parents responding to the needs of their children, arguably regarded as 
among the most emotionally close individuals in a person’s life. Many reasons for why this may 
be the case exist. For one, the caregiving system is biologically rooted in caregiving toward 
offspring, and helping toward non-related others is theorized to be an extension of this system (S. 
L. Brown, Brown, et al., 2011). Caregiving motivation becomes activated when need is salient in 
close relationships (Konrath & Brown, 2013). Because children tend to be emotionally closer 
targets that demonstrate a history of being needy and vulnerable, they may be more likely to 
elicit caregiving motivation to activate the stress-buffering benefits of the system. Chronic 
activation of the caregiving system from responding to the needs of children may accumulate in 
long-term habitual dyadic interactions that would ultimately benefit long-term health outcomes. 
This suggests that caregiving motivation may be activated more when responding to the needs of 
one’s children compared to other recipients, therefore contributing to greater health benefits for 





The health benefits of giving support to others may also be more pronounced among 
parents responding to their children because the parent-child bond is arguably more communal in 
nature, and is organized hierarchically to favor the needs of the one’s own children above others, 
an idea that is supported by theory and research on communal relationships. Communal 
relationships are those in which benefits are provided in response to others’ needs or out of 
general concern, without feelings of indebtedness or expectations of repayments (Clark & Mills, 
1993). They are organized hierarchically in a pyramid, with many weaker-strength communal 
relationships at the base (e.g., acquaintances), fewer medium-strength relationships in the middle 
(e.g., friends), and very few high-strength relationships at the top (e.g., children; Reis et al., 
2004). Within the hierarchy of communal relationships, the communal strength (i.e. the degree of 
motivation to respond to a partner's needs) of each relationship predicts which partner’s needs 
should take precedence (Mills et al., 2004; Mills & Clark, 1982). When there are motivational 
conflicts to respond to the needs of two different communal partners, the partner from the 
stronger communal category typically takes precedence. For example, individuals will be more 
likely to attend their child’s graduation than a niece’s graduation occurring on the same day. 
Therefore, psychological theories on communal relationships suggest that people are highly 
motivated to help their children, who are typically at the top of their communal hierarchies (Mills 
et al., 2004; Mills & Clark, 1982; Reis et al., 2004). Because children’s needs take precedence 
above others lower on the communal hierarchy (presumably, less emotionally close) and people 
are attuned to their children’s needs, responding to children’s needs may activate the caregiving 
system to a greater degree than interacting with less close others. Therefore, theory and research 





downstream health benefits to a greater extent among parents interacting with their children, than 
interacting with less close others.  
 Communal hierarchy as a proxy for emotional closeness. Directed by the 
commonalities between theory and research on communal hierarchies and emotional closeness, 
the present research uses communal hierarchy as the basis for the degree of emotional closeness. 
For one, prominent theorists on self-other overlap have explicitly linked self-other overlap with 
communal relationships, describing self-other overlap as the “foundation for spontaneously 
being concerned with the others’ needs (‘because others’ needs are my needs’) and thus both 
directly facilitating communal motivation (attention to and acting on others’ needs) and having 
possibly functioned historically to help create a social norm of communal orientation in close 
relationships” (Aron, Mashek, & Aron, 2004, p. 36). Second, experimental inductions of the 
emotional closeness factor of self-other overlap in the past have typically asked participants to 
think about different close and non-close targets that mirror levels of the communal hierarchy  
(e.g., in order of close to non-close: a close family member, a good friend, an acquaintance, a 
near stranger; Cialdini et al., 1997). Lastly, research and theory suggest that both hierarchical 
communal relationships and the degree of emotional closeness similarly drive the motivation to 
preferentially provide help to partners with higher communal strength or emotional closeness. 
Indeed research has confirmed that the degree of relationship closeness to individuals accounts 
for a larger amount of variance in the desire to help than other plausible mediators, and that one’s 
willingness to help is exponentially higher for those from relationship categories that are 
typically considered higher in communal strength (Cialdini et al., 1997).    





Parenting is one of life’s most stressful yet simultaneously most rewarding relationships. 
As such, there may be mechanisms in place to help regulate the stress of parenting. For example, 
parents have reduced ambulatory blood pressure (Holt-Lunstad, Birmingham, Howard, & 
Thoman, 2009), are better at regulating stressors (Wartella et al., 2003), and have stronger social 
networks after children have left the home (Ishii-Kuntz & Seccombe, 1989) than non-parents – 
and all of these mechanisms have been linked with reduced mortality (e.g., Cohen & Wills, 
1985; Kikuya et al., 2005; Seeman, Kaplan, Knudsen, Cohen, & Guralnik, 1987). Parents also 
report that they are happier and have greater meaning in life than non-parents, and report greater 
happiness and meaningfulness on a daily basis, especially during childcare compared to other 
daily activities (Nelson, Kushlev, English, Dunn, & Lyubomirsky, 2013).   
Emotionally-involved parenting may lead to maternal reward or stress-regulation. For 
example, giving support to loved ones who are experiencing distress increases the activation a 
reward-related brain region that is also activated during maternal caregiving behavior (Inagaki & 
Eisenberger, 2012). Parents who tend to prioritize their children’s well-being above their own are 
more likely to experience greater well-being and meaning in life derived from their children 
(Ashton-James, Kushlev, & Dunn, 2013). During parental behaviors in rats (e.g. licking, 
grooming), hormones are released to restore and regulate the stresses of parenting (Numan, 
2006).  
Taken together, research suggests that parents may experience physical health benefits, 
compared to non-parents. Yet, not much prior research has specifically examined whether the 
degree or continuation of parental involvement predicts better health outcomes, especially among 





parent. Presumably these health outcomes should be maximized for lifelong parents who 
continue to be highly involved in parenting.  
The Present Research 
Drawing from the model of caregiving and health (Konrath & Brown, 2013), research 
and theory on communal hierarchies and emotional closeness, and the health benefits of 
parenting, the present research empirically tests whether emotional closeness may be one 
relationship variable that implicates the stress-regulating benefits of caregiving. Furthermore, the 
present research explores whether giving to targets who are presumably very emotionally close, 
such as one’s own children, may lead to more pronounced benefits for health than giving to 
targets who are less emotionally close.  
In summary, given the extant theory and research, the present research hypothesizes that 
only giving to one’s children would predict reduced mortality risk over time, whereas giving to 
other people may not influence mortality risk because children are emotionally close others who 
may be more likely to activate caregiving motivation to affect long-term health outcomes.   
Study 5a: Giving Support to Adult Children Predicts Mortality Risk Among Parents 
Study 5a tested the research hypothesis using data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal 
Study (WLS) to examine the association between giving and mortality risk a) within different 
relationship categories that presumably vary on degree of emotional closeness, b) using healthy, 
non-clinical samples of older adults, c) across an extensive timeframe. Older adults are a prime 
population to test the hypotheses, because they experience greater mortality risk and therefore 
may experience more pronounced health benefits from providing ongoing support to emotionally 
close others.  In the study, participants were asked to rate their support provisions to recipients 





friends and acquaintances) at one time point to see how giving support would predict mortality 
status 17 years later.  To isolate the unique effects of giving support to one particular category of 
individuals on mortality risk, the analyses controlled for factors that may influence both of these 
variables, such as giving support to any of the other recipient groups, receiving support from the 
different recipient groups, and socio-economic demographic, physical and mental health, and 
risk factors. Based on the reasoning outline above, I hypothesize that providing support to adult 
children would predict reduced mortality risk among older adults, whereas providing support to 
the other categories of people would not.   
Method 
The Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (2009) has followed a random sample of 10,317 
Wisconsin high school graduates since their graduation in 1957 until the present. The original 
sample consisted of about 66.7% non-Hispanic White men and women who completed at least 
12 years of schooling and has very poor representation of African-American, Hispanic, or Asian 
participants.  Because the research hypotheses explore how support transactions with various 
categories of people (e.g., parents, children, siblings) influence mortality risk, the sample was 
limited to participants who had those specific individuals with whom support transactions could 
occur. Specifically, of all of the respondents with data collected at Time 1 in 1992 (n=10,143), 
only respondents who had at least 1 child (92.1% of total sample), at least 1 parent who was alive 
(63.1% of total sample), and at least 1 sibling who was alive (98.6% of total sample) at Time 1 
were selected for the study. After constraining the sample based on these criteria, 4,469 
respondents (65.0% of total sample) were included in the present study. The final study sample 
was 47.1% male, and the median age was 53 years (range 51 to 56) in Time 1 (1992) and 70 





Overview of data analysis.  A hierarchical logistic regression was conducted to 
examine the effect of support given to various recipients in Time 1 on mortality risk 17 years 
later (in Time 2), controlling for support received from the same recipients, and demographic and 
health variables. All covariates were assessed in Time 1. 
Mortality data. Mortality status was assessed in Time 2 in 2009 with a dichotomous 
variable (0=alive, 1=deceased) based on the Social Security Death Index, an objective database 
of death records created by the US Social Security Administration. Of the subsample of 4,469 
respondents, 445 (9.96%) were deceased and 4,024 (90.04%) were alive in 2009.  
Baseline measures. 
Support given. Support given was assessed in Time 1 by asking respondents whether 
they had given social support to five recipient categories: (a) adult children (“sons or daughters 
19 and older”), (b) parents, (c) siblings (“brothers or sisters”), (d) other relatives (other than 
parents, children, or siblings), and (e) friends and acquaintances (“friends, neighbors, co-
workers”) in the past month. There were four types of support: (a) help with transportation, 
errands, or shopping, (b) housework, yard work, repairs or other work around the house, (c) 
advice, encouragement, moral or emotional support, and (d) childcare (0=no, 1=yes), which were 
then averaged to create an index of support given to each recipient group.  
Control variables. Control variables were assessed and entered into a hierarchical logistic 
regression of support given predicting mortality risk (Step 1). Specifically respondents reported 
their support received from the same categories of people and types of support (Step 2), their 
demographic information (Step 3), and their health and risk factors (Step 4).  
Demographics. Demographics included respondents’ age (range 68-73 at Time 2), 





widowed, never married), number of children (1 to 14), and frequency of religious attendance in 
the past year (0=never, or less than once per year, 11=approximately once per day or more). 
Socioeconomic status was assessed using the number of years of education, respondents’ and 
spouse’s combined net worth, and respondents’ employment status (0=not employed, 
1=employed).  
Health. Health was assessed using respondents’ total number of illnesses, self-reported 
health, and functional status. The total number of illnesses was a continuous variable calculated 
by summing 17 items asking respondents whether a medical professional has ever informed them 
that they had a specific health problem (e.g., cancer, diabetes, heart trouble, etc). Self-reported 
health was assessed from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent). Respondents indicated their functional status 
by reporting any long-term physical or mental condition, illness or disability that limited their 
daily activities (0=no, 1=yes). Risk factors included a history of regular smoking (0=no, 1=yes), 
and body mass index (BMI), which was calculated based on respondent’s weight and height.   
Personality. Personality was assessed with the Big 5 (John, 1990).  Respondents were 
asked the extent to which they see themselves as having a number of characteristics from 1 
(Strongly Agree) to 6 (Strongly Disagree). Extraversion sample items are “talkative” and “full of 
energy.”  Agreeableness sample items are “generally trusting” and “considerate to almost 
everyone.” Conscientiousness sample items are “does a thorough job” and “a reliable worker.”  
Neuroticism sample items are “can be tense” and “worries a lot.” Openness sample items are 
“values artistic, aesthetic experiences” and “has an active imagination.” The items are coded and 
summed so that higher values indicated greater endorsement of a particular personality trait.  
Mental health. Mental health was assessed with measures of depressive symptoms and 





(CES-D; Radloff, 1977) which asked respondents to rate “on how many days during the past 
week did you” do the following from 0 to 7 days. Sample items included “feel sad,” “feel lonely” 
“have crying spells” “feel that people disliked you,” and “feel you could not ‘get going.” CES-D 
scores were calculated based on WLS’s recommended method, which differed slightly from the 
traditional method. Specifically, according to the WLS scoring instructions, if “respondents 
answered at least 10 questions, then a sum is computed. Other respondents answered questions 
scattered throughout [the questionnaire] and left the remainder of the questions blank. It was 
assumed that these respondents only answered the questions that applied to them. If at least 3 
items throughout the page were answered and all items answered received a nonzero response; a 
sum was computed…using 0 as the score for unanswered questions” (“Wisconsin Longitudinal 
Study: 1992-1993 Primary Respondent Mail Follow-Up Survey,” n.d.). The total number of 
depressive symptoms could range from 0 to 140 with higher values indicating greater 
psychological distress.  
Well-being. Well-being was measured by the Psychological Well-Being Scale (Ryff & 
Keyes, 1995; Ryff & Singer, 1998; Ryff, 1995).  Respondents rated a series of statements on the 
extent to which each statement describes them from 1(Strongly Agree) to 6(Strongly Disagree). 
The scale assessed 6 dimensions of well-being: Autonomy (e.g., “I am not afraid to voice my 
opinions, even when they are in opposition to the opinions of most people”), Environmental 
mastery (e.g., “I am quite good at managing the many responsibilities of my daily life”), 
Personal growth (e.g., “I have the sense that I have developed a lot as a person over time”), 
Positive relations with others (e.g., “It seems to me that most other people have more friends 
than I do”), Purpose in life (e.g., “I don't have a good sense of what it is I'm trying to accomplish 





Psychological well-being was created by summing the scores across the 6 dimensions, such that 
higher scores indicate greater well-being. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics.  Table III.1 reports correlations between all social support 
variables, showing that respondents who gave support to one recipient category (e.g. child) were 
also more likely to receive support from that same category (.28<r<.40, all p’s<.01). This 
suggests some degree of reciprocity in giving-receiving relationships, which further justifies the 
inclusion of received support as a covariate. 
To examine whether respondents gave more support to any specific relationship group, I 
conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction with 5 within-
subjects levels representing support given to (a) adult children, (b) parents, (c) siblings, (d) other 
relatives, and (e) friends and acquaintances, F(3.27,11488.06)=1250.81, p<.001, ηp
2 =.26. 
Follow-up post-hoc tests indicated that respondents gave the most support to their adult children 
(M=0.53) followed by their friends and acquaintances (M=0.42), their parents (M=0.36), their 
siblings (M=0.12), and their other relatives (M=0.10). All comparisons were significant, all 
p’s<.001. 
To examine whether respondents received more support from any specific relationship 
group, I conducted another repeated measures ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction, 
F(3.04,7832.88)=847.57, p<.001, ηp
2 =.25. Follow-up post-hoc tests indicated that respondents 
received the most support from their friends (M=.52) followed by their adult children (M=0.48), 
p<.05, and then their parents (M=0.16), siblings (M=0.15), and other relatives (M=0.08). 
Respondents received the same amount of support from parents as from siblings, ns, but all other 





Effect of support given on mortality among respondents with children. A hierarchical 
logistic regression tested the effect of support given on 17-year mortality risk (Step 1) among 
respondents with children, and also examined whether these effects remained significant after 
controlling for support received (Step 2), demographic variables (Step 3), and physical and 
mental health and risk factors (Step 4), and personality traits (Step 5). Table III.2 reports 
descriptive statistics for all variables of interest and test statistics from each step of the analysis. 
Assets were non-normally distributed (skewness = 2.23, kurtosis = 4.66), so this variable was 
rescaled to > 0 and log transformed (skewness = -.78, kurtosis = -.32). 
In support of the hypothesis, respondents who gave support to adult children had 
significantly reduced mortality risks 17 years later, β=-0.59, p=.004, Odds ratio=0.55, C.I.[0.37-
0.82], which represents a 45% decline in mortality risk for each cumulative type of support given 
to adult children. This effect remained when controlling for:  receiving support, β=-0.69, p=.002, 
Odds ratio=0.50, C.I.[0.32-0.78], demographic and socioeconomic factors, β= 0.64, p=.006, 
Odds ratio=0.53, C.I.[0.34-0.83], and physical health and risk factors, β=-0.61, p=.009, Odds 
ratio=0.55, C.I.[0.35-0.86], and personality traits, β=-0.56, p=.017, Odds ratio=0.57, C.I.[0.36-
0.90]. With all covariates included, mortality risk is reduced 43% for each cumulative type of 
support given to adult children. There was no difference in mortality risk associated with giving 
or receiving support from any of the other relational categories (β’s<|0.45|, p’s > 0.197; See 
Table III.2). 
Type of support given to children. To explore whether these effects were driven by a 
specific type of support given to children, a logistic regression tested the individual effects 
different kinds of support on later mortality risk, that is, (a) transportation, errands, or shopping, 





moral or emotional support, and (d) childcare. No specific type of support given to children 
individually predicted change in mortality risk: Transportation, β=0.02, p=.92, Odds ratio=1.03, 
C.I.[0.65-1.62]; Housework, β=-0.28, p=.27, Odds ratio=0.76, C.I. [0.46-1.25]; Emotional 
Support, β=-.30; p=.20, Odds ratio =0.74, C.I. [0.47-1.17]; and Childcare, β=0.24, p=.29, Odds 
ratio=1.28, C.I.[0.82-1.99]. Thus, all forms of support must be considered together in order to 
predict later mortality risk benefits.  
Effect of covariates on mortality. Of the covariates that were included in the model, 
only gender, β=0.38, p<.05, Odds ratio=1.46, C.I.[1.04-2.04], employment status, β=-0.52, 
p<.01, Odds ratio=0.59, C.I.[0.41-0.87], self-rated health, β=-0.58, p<.001, Odds ratio=0.56, 
C.I.[0.45-0.70], history of smoking β=0.46, p<.01, Odds ratio=1.59, C.I.[1.15-2.19] 
agreeableness, β=0.04, p<.05, Odds ratio=1.04, C.I.[1.00-1.08], and conscientiousness, β=-0.04, 
p<.05, Odds ratio=0.96, C.I.[0.92-1.00] predicted mortality risk in the final model. The findings 
suggest that participants who were male or employed or who reported poorer health, a history of 
smoking, more agreeableness, or less conscientious had higher mortality risk than their 
respective counterparts. Net worth marginally predicted lower mortality risk only when it was 
initially entered in the model, β=-0.38, p=.088, Odds ratio=0.68, C.I.[0.44-1.06], but became 
non-significant once health and risk factors were entered as well, β=-0.20, p=.376, Odds 
ratio=0.81, C.I.[0.52-1.28], and remained non-significant once personality factors were entered, 
β=-0.16, p=.489, Odds ratio=0.85, C.I.[0.54-1.35]. 
Discussion 
Study 5a examines whether a proxy for emotional closeness (i.e., relationship type) 
affects the degree of health benefits associated with giving to others. Specifically, the present 





relationship category, such as one’s own children, may lead to more pronounced benefits for 
health than giving to targets from a less emotionally close relationship category. This may be 
because children may be more likely to activate the stress regulating properties of the caregiving 
system compared to non-children. In support, Study 5a found that providing support to adult 
children predicted reduced mortality risk of older adult support providers by 43% per support 
type 17 years later, even after controlling for covariates that may influence mortality like 
receiving support, and demographic and physical and mental health variables. Providing support 
to other recipients (i.e., parents, siblings, other relatives, and friends) was not significantly 
associated with mortality risk, controlling for covariates. Nor was receiving support associated 
with mortality risk.  
Giving support to children was hypothesized to predict pronounced health benefits. 
Although this study did not examine why these effects occur, I hypothesize that it is because 
responding to the needs of one’s children may activate caregiving motivation (and therefore its 
stress-regulating benefits) to a greater extent than responding to others who are not children. The 
extent to which caregiving motivation is activated could be approximated by the amount of 
support given to the different targets. Supporting the hypothesis, the study found that support 
providers are most likely to provide support to their adult children, followed by their friends and 
acquaintances, parents, siblings, and their other relatives. This suggests that support providers are 
highly attuned to the needs of their adult children, which may have activated their caregiving 
motivation, which in turn may have influenced health outcomes. In alignment with theory on the 
caregiving system, the findings suggest that giving to children predicted reduced mortality risk 






The type of support, whether emotional support, or instrumental support, does not seem 
to independently affect mortality risk, suggesting that all forms of support must be considered 
together in order to predict later mortality risk benefits. Furthermore, the covariates predict 
mortality risk in accordance with previous research, which establishes the validity of this sample.   
One limitation of the research is that the current sample only included parents, making it 
difficult to assess the mortality effects of support given to non-children. Given that parents are 
highly attuned to their children’s needs above those of others, perhaps giving to one’s adult 
children predicted a greater likelihood of being alive 17 years later among this sample because 
parents are primarily focusing on their children’s needs, leaving fewer support provisions for 
others. After all, respondents did report giving the most type of support to their adult children 
than other categories of people. Therefore the sample may be skewed to favor assessing 
mortality benefits among parents who give to their children, and disfavor assessing mortality 
benefits among parents who give to others who are not their children. This suggests that the 
present parent sample may limit validity of analyses on support provisions to non-child targets 
and mortality risk. Study 5b aimed addressed this limitation by testing the role of support 
provisions on mortality risk among non-parents.  
Study 5b: Giving Support Does Not Predict Mortality Risk Among Non-parents 
Although Study 5a analyses of support provisions to non-children targets on mortality 
risk statistically controlled for the degree of giving to children and the number of children 
parents have, an alternative test of the whether giving to non-child targets influences mortality 
risk involves examining the support-mortality association among a sample of individuals without 
children (i.e,. non-parents). To examine this exploratory research question, Study 5b examined 





among the unique population of respondents without children using a hierarchical logistic 
regression model similar to that of Study 5a. 
Method 
Study 5b used data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (2009) as in Study 5a, but 
limited the sample to participants without any children. Specifically, of all of the respondents 
with data collected at Time 1 in 1992 (n=10,143), only respondents who did not have any 
children (7.9% of total sample), at least 1 parent who was alive (63.1% of total sample), and at 
least 1 sibling who was alive (98.6% of total sample) at Time 1 were selected for the study. After 
constraining the sample based on these criteria, 351 respondents (3.4% of total sample) were 
included in the present study. The final study sample was 42.7% male, and the median age was 
53 years (range 52 to 56) in Time 1 (1992) and 69 years (range 68 to 71) in Time 2 (2009).  
Overview of data analysis. A hierarchical logistic regression was conducted to examine 
the effect of support given to various recipients in Time 1 on mortality risk 17 years later (in 
Time 2), controlling for support received from the same recipients, and demographic and health 
variables. All covariates were assessed in Time 1. 
Effect of support given on mortality among respondents without children. A 
hierarchical logistic regression tested the effect of support given on 17-year mortality risk (Step 
1), and also examined whether these effects remained significant after controlling for support 
received (Step 2), demographic variables (Step 3), and physical and mental health and risk 
factors (Step 4), and personality traits (Step 5). Because respondents in the sample do not have 
any children, the analyses did not include covariates of support given to and received from adult 
children as well as the number of children. Table III.3 reports descriptive statistics for all 





Respondents who gave support to friends had marginally reduced mortality risks 17 years 
later in Step 1, β=-1.28, p=.059, Odds ratio=0.28, C.I.[0.74-1.05], but this effect disappeared and 
remained non-significant when controlling for:  receiving support, β=-0.95, p=.216, Odds 
ratio=0.39, C.I.[0.09-1.74], demographic and socioeconomic factors, β= -0.83, p=.318, Odds 
ratio=0.44, C.I.[0.09-2.22], and physical and mental health and risk factors, β=-0.88, p=.312, 
Odds ratio=0.41, C.I.[0.07-2.30], and personality traits, β=-0.94, p=.345, Odds ratio=0.39, 
C.I.[0.06-2.75].7 This suggests that any health benefit associated with giving support to friends is 
explained by these covariates. There was no difference in mortality risk associated with giving or 
receiving support from any of the other relational categories (β’s<|1.39|, p’s > 0.240; See Table 
III.3). 
Effect of covariates on mortality. Of the covariates that were included in the model, 
only history of smoking, β=1.19, p=.06, Odds ratio=3.30, C.I.[0.98-11.15], well-being, β=--0.04, 
p<.01, Odds ratio=0.97, C.I.[0.94-0.99], and conscientiousness, β=-0.27, p<.01, Odds 
ratio=1.31, C.I.[1.08-1.59] predicted mortality risk in the final model. The findings suggest that 
participants who reported a history of smoking, less well-being, or more conscientious had 
higher mortality risk than their respective counterparts.  
Discussion 
Study 5b found that providing support to others did not predict mortality risk among 
childless older adult support providers. Although providing support to friends initially predicted 
reduced mortality risk, the effect became non-significant after controlling for the covariates that 
may influence mortality like receiving support, and demographic and physical and mental health 
variables. The findings suggest that providing support to non-child targets does not predict 





motivation for long-term health outcomes may be more pronounced when interacting with 
children. Lastly, it appears that emotional closeness does not moderate the role of giving support 






 Chapter III explored the relationship between self-other overlap and prosocial behavior in 
close relationships by demonstrating that relationship type, a proxy for emotional closeness (i.e. 
one factor in self-other overlap), moderates prosocial behavior to influence long-term health 
benefits for the self. Specifically, giving support to one’s children, who are typically found to be 
at the top of the communal hierarchy (Mills et al., 2004; Mills & Clark, 1982; Reis et al., 2004), 
predicted reduced mortality risk among older adults (Study 5a). Giving to other recipient groups 
did not predict mortality risk among either parents (Study 5a) or non-parents (Study 5b). To our 
knowledge, the current study was the first to demonstrate that people are more likely to 
experience reduced mortality risk from supporting their children, specifically, but not from 
supporting other recipient groups (and not from receiving support). 
 Why may giving to children predict reduced mortality risk? Although this study did not 
examine potential mediators of this effect, reasons point to the stress-regulating benefits of 
caregiving motivation on health (Konrath & Brown, 2013). The model caregiving and health 
posits that cues of need elicit caregiving motivation to promote helping behavior, which in turn 
influences stress-regulation (Konrath & Brown, 2013). In other words, this model argues that 
giving to others could benefit one’s own health to the extent that more caregiving motivation is 
elicited by the giving behavior (Konrath & Brown, 2013). The degree to which caregiving 
motivation was activated could be approximated by the amount of helping (i.e., support 
provided) in the present research. Specifically, the present research assumes that the amount of 
helping reported by respondents is a proxy for the degree to which caregiving motivation was 
elicited. Study 5a found that respondents reported giving the most types of support to their adult 





that caregiving motivation was activated more when responding to the needs of their children 
compared to other people. The caregiving system affects health through the activation of 
neuroprotective hormones like oxytocin and progesterone when helping others (e.g., salivary 
progesterone; S. L. Brown et al., 2009). Over time, habitual dyadic interactions of helping could 
accumulate and result in long-term health benefits if caregiving motivation is regularly activated.  
The caregiving system model also argues that the extent to which caregiving motivation 
is activated when responding to cues of need may be moderated by relationship variables, such 
as emotional closeness (Konrath & Brown, 2013). The present research argues that the 
caregiving system may be more pronounced when responding to the needs of emotionally close 
others, like the needs of one’s children. This is because the caregiving system is rooted in 
maternal circuitry and also occurs in communal relationships that favors children’s needs above 
others. Caregiving motivation may therefore be elicited to a greater extent when helping children 
compared to non-children. In support, findings from Study 5a suggest that older adult parents 
were more likely to be alive when they reported giving support to their adult children 17 years 
earlier. Furthermore, respondents reported giving the most types of support to their adult 
children, suggesting that they are highly attuned to the needs of their children, a finding that both 
support assumptions within the hierarchy of communal relationships and the caregiving system 
model. Therefore, the results suggest that emotional closeness may moderate the degree to which 
caregiving motivation is activated in a manner that favors the needs of children. Giving support 
to children may turn into habitual dyadic interactions that ultimately accumulate in long-term 
health benefits for givers, such as reduced mortality risk.  
Although responding to the needs of children may be inherently stressful, the model of 





respondents reported giving more support to their children than other people, there may be more 
inherent stress from these interactions (e.g., from experiencing the pain or need of the child, from 
having less time or energy for the self). However, the model of caregiving and stress-regulation 
hypothesizes that ”caregiving motivations can help to alleviate givers’ stress responses 
regardless of why they occur, even if they originate from the giving behavior itself” (Konrath & 
Brown, 2013, p. 11). This occurs because the activation of caregiving motivation regulates the 
stress of parenting via the release of neuroprotective and stress-regulating hormones.  
Unfortunately the study did not include parallel measures of giving and receiving support 
to spouses, who are relational partners with potentially similar levels of communal strength as 
children. There were no measures of the amount of support given to and received from one’s 
spouse within the same time period that could be used in the analyses. Future research should 
examine whether providing more support to one’s spouse versus one’s child (which may be a 
great motivational conflict for many) has greater health benefits. 
 The relationship between providing support to adult children and mortality risk remained 
significant, taking into consideration several covariates that may influence mortality risk.  In 
terms of other moderators within the model of caregiving and health system, the present research 
controlled for a series of factors that would influence resources for helping (e.g., socioeconomic 
status, physical health, health risk factors, mental health) and individual differences variables 
(e.g., demographics, personality traits). Furthermore, the study also controls for social integration 
and support (e.g., social support given and received from other recipients). Given this, it may be 
that the primary mechanism through which social support to adult children predict reduced 
mortality risk involves the mechanism of stress-regulation, as theorized by the model of 





Although the caregiving and health model points to stress-regulating benefits of 
neuroprotective hormones like oxytocin and progesterone, this was not tested directly given 
limitations inherent within the data. For example, it is possible that parents who provide support 
to their adult children experience elevated moods (Danner, Snowdon, & Friesen, 2001; E. W. 
Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2008),  a greater sense of purpose or meaning (Boyle, Barnes, 
Buchman, & Bennett, 2009), or direct physiological benefits such as lower cortisol and blood 
pressure, and higher oxytocin (Field et al., 1998; Gleason, Iida, Bolger, & Shrout, 2003; Holt-
Lunstad, Birmingham, & Light, 2008; Krause, Herzog, & Baker, 1992; Piferi & Lawler, 2006; 
Schoorlemmer, Peeters, Van Schoor, & Lips, 2009; Taylor et al., 2000), all of which have 
independently been shown to be associated with both giving to others and better health 
outcomes.   
In the data, there were no measures of self-reported stress or hormones directly between 
the assessment of support and mortality that we can test as potential mediators of the reported 
effect between support given to children and mortality risk. A measure of the number of stressful 
events did exist, but the measure covered the total number of stressful events that occurred across 
the respondent’s lifespan and was therefore too broad to include as a covariate. Alternative 
measures of stress between the assessment of support and mortality could be approximated by 
mental health variables like depression, well-being, or positive and negative emotions. Measures 
of these constructs did exist (in 2004) between the measures of support (1992) and mortality 
(2009). However analyses that included these potential mediators as a covariate were unreliable 
because of the extensive missing data that occurred after their inclusion.  
Taken together, the present research was not able to test the stress-regulating pathways by 





theoretically driven by the model of caregiving and health, which itself was based on substantive 
evidence that indicates that caregiving system implicates health via stress-regulating hormones 
(Konrath & Brown, 2013). Nevertheless, future directions should attempt to replicate the 
findings in a more representative sample with appropriate measures of support, mortality, and 
potential mediators.  
Giving support to adult children may predict reduced morality risk among older adults 
partially due to genetic overlap and propagation. In terms of more distal outcomes, the results 
could partially be explained by evolutionary theories of kin selection, since providing support to 
adult children may increase the likelihood of directly passing on one’s genes. When considering 
resource allocation, providing support to one’s adult children ensures that resources are being 
invested in future generations to maximize fitness benefits. In contrast, providing support to 
one’s parents would divert such resources from needy future generations to an older generation 
that may no longer directly contribute fitness benefits. Providing support to one’s siblings or 
other relatives would only lead to indirect fitness benefits through the survival of the relatives’ 
children.  
When considering why people may be motivated to provide ongoing support during their 
post-reproductive period, one’s own fitness may be increased during this time by supporting 
adult children during their reproductive years. In what is known as the “grandmother 
hypothesis,” evolutionary theorists argue that grandmothers were a central determinant in human 
longevity because of their ability to contribute to childcare after menopause (Hawkes, 2004). 
Indeed, evidence in support of the grandmother hypothesis finds that the presence of 
grandmothers during adult children’s reproductive years correlates with offsprings’ fitness (i.e., 





2004). Therefore, providing support to adult children (during their reproductive years) may make 
parents better at passing on their own genes, whereas providing support to siblings or other 
relatives’ would promote the passing of these relatives’ genes more directly.  
 One limitation of this study is its inability to tease apart emotional closeness and genetic 
relatedness explanations. Previous research has demonstrated that emotional closeness is an 
important proximal cause of prosocial behavior that partially explains the relationship between 
genetic relatedness and the likelihood of helping during life-threatening situations (Korchmaros 
& Kenny, 2001). In Study 5a, it may be that the proximal explanation for the support-mortality 
association may be emotional closeness to the child, and the distal outcome of post-reproductive 
parenting is the survival and continuation of one’s genes. Yet since emotional closeness to each 
of the recipients of support was not measured, we cannot determine whether it is a good 
explanation for the findings. 
The study is limited by the self-report nature of the support measures, which are 
subjected to biases toward being a good parent. To the best of our knowledge, the relatively new 
field on the benefits of giving support has not examined whether self-report ratings of giving 
support correlate with potentially more objective observer reports of giving. Future studies 
should code observed interactions between older parents and their adult children to see if the 
more objective measures of support provisions would predict later morbidity or mortality risk. 
Regardless, the use of self-report support measures in the present research is in line with past 
research linking support provisions to reduced mortality risk (S. L. Brown et al., 2003). 
The study is also limited by its homogenous sample, which consists of a majority 
Caucasian sample from a similar birth cohort and a single geographic area, making it unclear if 





can help to illuminate interesting relationships by keeping some variables constant (Danner et al., 
2001), we recommend that future studies examine the research questions among more diverse 
populations.  
Finally, because the analyses were limited to support transactions between known 
partners, this does not mean that there would never be health benefits associated with giving to 
unknown others (Konrath & Brown, 2013). Rather, perhaps such health benefits are weaker, or 
exist for other reasons than those that would explain why giving to children is associated with 
reduced mortality risk. Regardless, the present studies have provided evidence that although 
there are many reasons to help and support others, regardless of the benefits that may accrue for 
givers, mortality benefits from providing support may only arise when providing support to one’s 
children. 
One potential avenue for future directions involves examining how different types of 
givers may moderate the relationship between giving to children and mortality risk. Specifically, 
in reality people regularly face many motivational conflicts, forcing them to juggle the desire to 
help multiple people simultaneously. Furthermore, although the communal hierarchy would 
argue that the child’s needs trump those of others, this may not always be the case. There are 
people who follow the traditional model and give most of their support provisions to their 
children only, and not as much to other relationship partners. But other types of givers exist as 
well. For example, people may face difficulty balancing support provisions to more than one 
group of people, such as those who give support to both their adult children and aging parents 
simultaneously. This latter group of individuals may experience stress-overload from being 
unable to juggle the demands of both parties, suggesting that the stress-regulating benefits from 





parents.  There may other types of givers who are overall very compassionate, other-focused 
individuals who give indiscriminately to everybody. Although giving to others has been 
associated with a host of mental and physical health benefits (for review, see Konrath & Brown, 
2013), too much giving has also been associated with compassion fatigue (e.g., Figley, 1995a, 
1995b). Therefore, it would be interesting for future directions to explore how the relationship 
between giving to emotionally close others and mortality risk operates among the different types 
of givers.  
In conclusion, the present chapter tested whether self-other overlap moderates the 
consequences of prosocial behavior. Conclusions argue that emotional closeness, one factor of 
self-other overlap, moderates the relationship between support provisions to other and mortality 
risk. Specifically, giving to adult children predicts reduced mortality risk among older adults, 
whereas giving to others do not. Taken together, the findings extend research and theory from a 
variety of research literatures, such as the model of caregiving and health, hierarchy of 












Over the last few decades, research has found that self-other overlap processes are 
important for both close relationships (Acitelli & Young, 1996; Agnew et al., 1998; Aron, 
McLaughlin-Volpe, et al., 2004; Le, Dove, Agnew, Korn, & Mutso, 2010; Murray, Holmes, 
Bellavia, Griffin, & Dolderman, 2002; Tsapelas et al., 2009) and prosocial behavior (Cialdini et 
al., 1997; Maner et al., 2002). The present dissertation aimed to extend the current literature on 
self-other overlap, prosocial behavior, and close relationships by examining the two research 
questions posed in the introduction: 1) What determines self-other overlap and how may this 
affect prosocial tendencies? 2) Does self-other overlap moderate the consequences of prosocial 
behavior? Across five studies, the dissertation has illuminated the intricacies in which self-other 
overlap relate to prosocial behavior and its consequences in close relationships by examining 
these constructs within both experimental and longitudinal contexts and across a variety of 
relationship partners (e.g., friends, married partners, children, parents, siblings, and other 
relatives).  
Summary of Key Findings 
What determines self-other overlap and how may this affect prosocial tendencies? 
Addressing the first question, Chapter II empirically explored whether discrete emotions shift 
perceptions of self-other overlap through changes in overlapping mental representations of close 





mental representations influence immediate prosocial tendencies toward close others. Findings 
contribute evidence that psychological self-other overlap is flexible in the moment and is easily 
shifted by factors like anger in close relationships, but not by other emotions like sadness, 
happiness, contentment, and gratitude.  
However, shifts in self-other overlap from anger (relative to a more neutral control) only 
occurred among close (Study 1) or best friends (Study 3), but not among married partners (Study 
4), suggesting that marital relationships may be one boundary condition for the shifting nature of 
self-other overlap. Interestingly, Chapter II found mixed evidence on whether shifts in self-other 
overlap from anger relative to a more neutral control would implicate downstream prosocial 
tendencies in close relationships. Study 1 initially found that reflecting on an anger experience in 
close friendships undermined subsequent helping, relative to the other conditions, through the 
mediating role of self-other overlap. However, subsequent tests failed to replicate this model 
among best friends (Study 3) or married partners (Study 4).  
The findings suggest that shifts in perceptions of self-other overlap after reliving anger 
experiences may not necessarily implicate downstream prosocial tendencies, and more research 
is needed to examine the conditions under which this process may or may not occur. 
Nevertheless, the present studies are the first, to the best of my knowledge, to directly explore 
the manner in which emotions causally impact self-other overlap. The pattern of data contributes 
converging evidence on the shifting potential of self-other overlap in close relationships, as well 
as bridge formerly disconnected research on self-other overlap and appraisal theory of emotion 
to present potential avenues for future research.  
Does self-other overlap moderate the consequences of prosocial behavior? 





the emotional closeness factor of self-other overlap would moderate the association between 
prosocial behavior and mortality risk across time. The findings suggest that providing support to 
children (i.e., who are often considered the most emotionally close relationship partners) 
predicted lower mortality risk, but providing support to other relationship partners was not 
associated with later mortality risk.  
Specifically, older adult parents who reported providing support to their adult children at 
one time point were more likely to be alive 17 years  later, controlling for covariates that may 
influence mortality risk (Study 5a). In fact, older adult parents reported that they provided the 
most types of support to their adult children, followed by their friends and acquaintances, 
parents, siblings, and their other relatives. Providing support to partners who are not adult 
children, whether parents, siblings, other relatives, or friends, did not predict mortality risk 
among either older adult parents (Study 5a) or non-parents (Study 5b), after controlling for 
plausible confounds.  
The findings are interpreted within the framework of the caregiving and health model 
(Konrath & Brown, 2012), which argues that 1) giving to others could benefit one’s own health 
to the extent that giving engages the biological caregiving system and 2) the caregiving system 
may be moderated by relationship variables, such as emotional closeness. The pattern of data 
contributes empirical support for the model of caregiving and health, while serving important 
implications for the more enduring nature of self-other overlap across time.  
Implications and Future Directions 
Taken together, Chapters II and III extend research on the nature of self-other overlap 
and prosocial behavior in close relationships with conclusions that pose important implications 





on the importance of investigating the shifting nature of self-other overlap, taking into 
consideration the type of relationship, while bridging research on self-other overlap with other 
literatures within the field of psychology. 
The shifting nature of self-other overlap. Chapter II contributes to the growing 
evidence that self-other overlap may shift in the moment.  Past theory and research has suggested 
that self-other overlap may be influenced by a host of relationship factors, such as shared 
experiences, self-disclosures, or the mere motivation to draw another person closer to the self 
(Agnew & Etcheverry, 2006; Aron et al., 1991, 1997; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). The present 
dissertation contributes one additional factor, arguing that particular discrete emotions, such as 
anger directed at a close or best friend, could momentarily undermine self-other overlap in 
relationships. The findings are framed within the appraisal tendency framework (Han et al., 
2007; Keltner et al., 2006; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Tiedens & 
Linton, 2001), which argues that anger may undermine self-other overlap because of its unique 
appraisal patterns that carry over to more negative downstream judgments. The research is the 
first, to the best of my knowledge, to bridge theory and research from appraisal theory of 
emotions with self-other processes in relationship. Connecting these two literatures not only 
informs theoretical support for the present research, but also presents fruitful avenues for future 
research. Specifically, future directions could elaborate on the effects of anger on self-other 
overlap by altering the cognitive-motivational properties underlying the anger experience, as 
well as manipulating factors related to emotions, such as the duration or intensity.  
Cognitive-motivational properties of anger. Although Studies 1 and 3 found that anger 
undermined self-other overlap among close and best friends, relative to a more neutral control, 





self-other overlap. Specifically, future directions could examine how changing the cognitive-
motivational properties of anger may influence how anger affects self-other overlap. For 
example, incidents in which both friends are angry at a common source of the anger outside of 
the relationship (e.g., a horrible boss) may strengthen instead of undermine self-other overlap, 
and this may occur via mechanisms of shared experience or self-disclosures.  
Emotional duration and intensity. Other avenues for future directions involve examining 
how long the negative effects of anger endure in close relationships and whether the intensity of 
the emotional experience matters. Perhaps in stronger close relationships, shifts in self-other 
overlap are more ephemeral in nature, lasting only a few minutes or a few hours before quickly 
bouncing back to pre-conflict levels. After all, Study 4 found that marital partners did not shift 
their self-other overlap after reflecting on an anger experience with their spouse, even though 
they indeed felt more negative emotion than other participants. This suggests that either marital 
partners did not shift their self-other overlap with their partner in the first place, or that whatever 
shifts that occurred were too short-lived to be captured by the present paradigm. Barring the 
duration of an emotional experience, the intensity of the experience may matter as well. Intense 
emotional experiences may have more enduring long-term effects for self-other overlap and the 
relationship (e.g., an epic fight that changes the fundamental nature of the relationship). 
Therefore, given all the unique intricacies of emotional experiences and relationship processes, 
future researchers should examine how properties of the emotional experience may change the 
manner in which it undermines or strengthens self-other overlap in close relationships.  
Self-other overlap moderate cumulative long-term health benefits. Although findings 
from Chapter II suggest that self-other overlap may fluctuate in the moment, Chapter III suggests 





and health (Konrath & Brown, 2013) posits that giving support to others benefits one’s own 
health through the activation of the biological caregiving system, and that the caregiving system 
is moderated by emotional closeness. Emotional closeness is a factor of self-other overlap that 
could contribute more long-term health outcomes, but only to the extent to which emotional 
closeness activates the biological caregiving system.  
Specifically, the model of caregiving and health posits that the type of chronic activation 
of the caregiving system likely to be present from responding to the needs of one’s children – 
even one’s adult children – would ultimately accumulate in long-term health benefits for the self 
via chronic activation of neuroprotective hormones. From this perspective, emotional closeness 
may exert more enduring influences on health because of the habitual motivation of parents to 
support their children in need. This assumption was supported by findings from Study 5a 
suggesting that older adult parents are not only motivated to help their adult children, but that 
they also are more likely to derive health benefits from doing so in the form of reduced mortality 
risk.  
Of course there may be parents who are not emotionally close to their children (e.g., 
emotionally distant parents) in the sample, but research paradigm takes these individuals into 
account. These emotionally distant parents would likely not be very involved in providing 
regular support to their children, and would therefore be less likely to report providing support to 
their adult children in our study. Our findings suggest that parents who reported providing 
support to their adult children at one time point were the ones that were more likely to be alive 
17 years later. Furthermore, in general, parents reported that they provided the most type of 
support to their children than other groups, suggesting that indeed, their children may be at the 





The beauty of the caregiving and health model is that it does not preclude momentary 
fluctuations in emotional closeness within relationship partners. For example, an older adult 
parent may experience momentary conflict with their adult children (e.g., over how best to raise 
their grandchild), and such conflicts may undermine emotional closeness in the moment. But 
ultimately over the course of years in which an adult child may express his or her needs 
countless times, the older adult parent is probably more likely to support the child than not, 
which would unleash the cascading benefits of neuroprotective hormones that accumulate into 
health benefits across time. Therefore, although emotional closeness may fluctuate in the 
moment just like overlapping mental representations factor of self-other overlap, emotional 
closeness nevertheless could exert cumulative long-term health benefits for the self.  
Mechanisms. Future directions should examine the mechanisms through which self-other 
overlap influences long-term health. The model of caregiving and health (Konrath & Brown, 
2013)  point to the mechanisms of neuroprotective hormones, such as oxytocin and progesterone, 
but actual test of these mechanisms were constrained by the nature of the dataset. Future 
direction could clarify the pathways by which giving support to emotionally close others that 
activate the caregiving system would predict reduced mortality risk across time.  
The type of relationship partner matters for self-other overlap. Both Chapters II and 
III speak to the importance of considering the type of relationship when examining self-other 
overlap and prosocial behavior in close relationships. Chapter II suggested that anger only 
undermined self-other overlap among close (Study 1) and best friends (Study 3), relative to a 
neutral condition, but not among marital partners (Study 4). Chapter III suggested that only 
giving to adult children predicted reduced mortality risk because adult children are considered 





(Study 5a). Giving to other targets who are not one’s own children, such as parents, siblings, or 
friends, did not predict mortality risk among both parents (Study 5a) and non-parents (Study 5b). 
Taken together, the research suggests that future research on self-other overlap should consider 
the type of relationship because different types of relationships influence the manner in which 
self-other overlap processes develop or persist.  
Measurement of self-other overlap. Both factors of self-other overlap, overlapping 
mental representations and emotional closeness, pose limitations inherent within their 
measurement that pave the way for future directions. The overlapping mental representations 
factor could benefit from the assessment of positive as well as negative traits to enlighten the 
manner in which discrete emotions affect self-other overlap. Furthermore, it would be interesting 
to examine how individual differences moderate the inclusion of negative and positive traits. The 
emotional closeness factor is partially confounded by genetic relatedness, a construct that is 
difficult to tease apart from emotionally close relationships. Future direction should tease part the 
two constructs to illuminate the manner in which emotional closeness influences long-term 
health outcomes.  
Overlapping mental representations. The overlapping mental representations factor of 
self-other overlap is commonly measured by assessing trait adjectives of the self and other 
(Batson et al., 1997; Davis et al., 1996; Myers & Hodges, 2012; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). The 
measure was first developed by Davis et al. (1996) but has been refined by many researchers 
over time, given a variety of measurement issues.  Davis and colleagues (1996) first measured 
self-other overlap with an adjective checklist of 159 positive, negative, and neutral traits 
attributed to the self and other.  Although the measure more directly addresses the concept of 





measure), the global yes-no checklist suggests that the self-other overlap scores could potentially 
be influenced by the number of traits actually checked, which may create interpretational 
problems (Batson et al., 1997).  Addressing these concerns, Batson and colleagues (1997) 
modified the Davis et al. (1996)’s trait checklist to use a rating scale that assesses 16 personal 
traits relevant to the need situation on a scale of 1 (not at all true of myself/Katie Banks) to 9 
(extremely true of myself/Katie Banks). Self-other overlap was calculated by taking the reversed 
score of the mean absolute difference between self and other ratings. Slotter and Gardner (2009) 
further refined the trait rating measure by using 15 attributes based on personality research by 
Anderson (1968) that were controlled to be neutral or slightly positively valenced.  
Although the present research used Slotter and Gardner (2009)’s measure of overlapping 
mental representations, the most refined measure of overlapping mental representations in the 
current literature, the measure nevertheless still presents interpretational problems within the 
current experimental paradigm. For one, the measure only has positive traits. One alternative 
interpretation of the findings is that anger undermined self-other overlap because it makes 
participants judge close others in less positive terms, relative to the other conditions. After all, 
the measure of self-other overlap only includes positive traits, suggesting that people in the angry 
relative to the control condition may have rated the positive traits as less characteristic of their 
close friend. This interpretation was tested and ruled out, suggesting that anger’s effect on self-
other overlap cannot be explained by participants in the angry condition simply rating the close 
other as having less positive traits.6  
The overlapping representation measure also precludes the assessment of whether anger 
affects the inclusion of negative traits from close friends. Although the present research tested 





would affect the inclusion of negative traits. Past research has found that people are more 
resistant to including negative than positive traits into the self (Davis et al., 1996; Myers & 
Hodges, 2012). This process may occur because people generally strive to maintain positive self-
concepts when faced by negative or threatening information, by engaging in self-enhancement, 
self-protection, or self-affirmation processes (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Gregg, 
2008; Steele, 1988; Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell, & Beach, 2000). Therefore, it may be that 
anger does not affect inclusion of negative traits because people are resistant to their inclusion in 
the first place.  
However, there are exceptions to this rule, especially considering situations when people 
are motivated to include the negative traits of others into their own self-concepts. For example, 
past research has suggested that relationship motivations matter for self-other overlap. The mere 
motivation to draw another person closer to the self  predicts the inclusion of positive traits 
(Slotter & Gardner, 2009). Furthermore, single individuals are more likely to include negative 
traits of potential romantic partners than non-romantic partners, and this effect is magnified by 
the extent to which they desire to meet the potential partner (Slotter & Gardner, 2012). 
Therefore, relationship-promoting motivations, such as romantic desire, can affect the inclusion 
of negative traits.  Lending this rationale to the present paradigm, priming relationship-
promoting motivation after the anger experience may allow the inclusion of negative traits from 
the close partner who caused the anger experience into the self (e.g., “she may have been 
inconsiderate, but I desire to be with her, so in reflection maybe I was inconsiderate too”).   
Individual differences could moderate the effect to which discrete emotions affect self-
other overlap. In general, people seek close others to verify their own self-concepts, even if they 





Ronde, 1992). Therefore personality traits pertaining to the self and others could moderate the 
inclusion of positive as well as negative traits. Research has suggested that attachment anxiety 
predicted more malleability of the self, and greater susceptibility to self-concept change or 
confusion with the close partner (Slotter & Gardner, 2012). Future directions could examine how 
traits like self-esteem could moderate the relationship between anger and self-other overlap. 
Given that low self-esteem individuals may be more likely to seek out information that verify 
their poor self-concepts, they may be more likely to include negative traits of others into the self. 
Anger can be a discrete emotion that undermines this process, by diverting the negative focus on 
the self to negative focus on others. In contrast, anger could enhance self-other overlap by 
allowing the self to further include more negative qualities of others into the self. Future 
directions testing these scenarios could enlighten the processes by which discrete emotions affect 
the inclusion of negative traits, as well as positive traits and how this process may be moderated 
by individual differences.  
Emotional closeness. The emotional closeness factor of self-other overlap is commonly 
measured by the Inclusion of Others in the Self Scale (IOS, Aron et al., 1992), a one-item 
measure with 7 Venn diagram-like pairs of increasingly overlapping circles where one circle of 
each pair represents the self and the other circle represents the relationship partner. Some 
researchers have argued that there are problems inherent in the measure because while it’s useful 
in capturing very broad feelings of closeness (Myers & Hodges, 2012), the measure may be too 
ambiguous, making it difficult to know whether the scores on the IOS reflect the degree of 
merging self-other concepts or something else  (Batson, 1997).  
One such problem that results with the vaguer conceptualization of emotional closeness is 





emotional closeness in prosocial behavior. Although traditional manipulations of emotional 
closeness within an experimental context typically have participants reflect on particular 
individuals of varying closeness (i.e., a near stranger, an acquaintance, a good friend, or a close 
family member; (Cialdini et al., 1997), these categories of people often overlap with the degree 
of genetic relatedness, presenting an inherent confound. Furthermore, emotional closeness is a 
proximal cause of prosocial behavior in the relationship between genetic relatedness and 
prosocial behavior during life-threatening situations (Korchmaros & Kenny, 2001). This 
confounding is difficult to tease apart, and should be pursued by future directions. One pursuit 
would involve examining the role of emotional closeness and prosocial behavior in long-term 
health outcomes among highly emotionally close partners who are not genetically related, such 
as spouses. After all, Study 4 found a ceiling effect in helping toward marital partners, 
suggesting that people overwhelmingly desire to help their spouses in need. Comparing the 
health benefits of providing support to spouses versus children would be an interesting direction 
for future research to tease apart these confounds. Another pursuit could examine the health 
consequences of support provided to biological versus non-biological children who are 
considered emotionally close to better separate the two constructs. Regardless, future directions 
should aim to tease apart emotional closeness from genetic relatedness to illuminate the ways in 
which self-other overlap impacts more cumulative long-term outcomes.  
Conclusion 
The present dissertation examined self-other overlap and prosocial behavior in close 
relationships within different contexts, using an integrative approach that incorporates multiple 
levels of analysis, such as experimental and longitudinal analysis, to explore both short-term and 





relationships, including close friends, married partners, adult children, parents, siblings, and 
other relatives. A key challenge for future direction is to develop an increasing nuanced 
understanding of how self-other overlap is measured, develops in relationships, and persists 
across time, depending on factors within individual situations and the relationship. Addressing 
these concerns, along with other questions raised by the findings, pave way for enriching 














1 Please note that self-other overlap can also be measured by assessing reaction times to trait 
adjectives (e.g., Aron et al., 1991). However because this measure was excluded from Myers & 
Hodges (2012)’s factor analysis, which focused only on the most popular measures of self-other 
overlap, it remains unclear whether the measure would factor into the overlapping mental 
representations factor of self-other overlap.  
 
2 A caveat to this statement is that the experiment paradigm assessed reaction time to whether 
traits of self, spouse, or an entertainment figure was true or not true of the target, rather than the 
trait adjective rating measure of overlapping mental representations (Batson et al., 1997; Davis et 
al., 1996; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). Results suggest that respondents were slower and made 
more errors when responding to traits that differed between the self and the spouse, suggesting 
that mental representations of the self and other are more closely overlapping. This was not the 
case for the non-close other (i.e., entertainment figure). 
 
3 Analyzing the entire sample without any exclusions in Study 3 did not significantly alter the 
findings of condition on self-other overlap or helping. The pattern of results were consistent with 
those reported in the final study, though they were weakened most likely by the extra noise from 
not excluding negligent participants: condition effect on self-other overlap, F(2,253)=2.85, 
p=.06; condition effect on helping, F(2,254)=1.59, p=.207. 
 
4 Analyzing the entire sample without any exclusions in Study 4 did not significantly alter the 
findings of condition on self-other overlap or helping. The pattern of results were consistent with 
those reported in the final study: condition effect on self-other overlap, F(2,147)=.39, p=.676; 
condition effect on helping, F(2,145)=.59, p=.555. 
 
5 Exploratory analyses were conducted to test whether arousal was a factor by merging data from 
studies 1 and 2 together. Dummy coding designated the high arousal emotion conditions (i.e., 
angry, happiness) as 1 and low arousal emotion conditions (i.e., sadness, contentment) as 0. This 
new arousal factor was then entered as a between subjects factor in a one-way ANOVAs on self-
other overlap. The main effect of arousal was non-significant, F<1, suggesting participants in the 
high (M = 5.49) versus low arousal (M = 5.44) emotion conditions did not report significantly 
different levels of self-other overlap.  Then, dummy coding designated positive emotion 
conditions (i.e., happiness, contentment) as 1 and negative emotion conditions (i.e., anger, 
sadness) as 0, and a 2 arousal (high vs. low) X 2 valence (negative vs. positive) ANOVA was 
conducted on self-other overlap. A marginal interaction emerged, F(1, 116) = 3.70, p=.06, 
η²=.031. Simple tests suggest a significant main effect of valence among high arousal emotions, 
F(1, 68) = 7.15, p<.01, η²=.095, where participants in the angry condition (M = 5.30) report 





of valence among low arousal emotion conditions, F<1, suggesting participants in the sad (M = 
5.46) and content (M = 5.42) conditions reported similar levels of self-other overlap. Essentially 
the interaction formally tested the statistical difference found for self-other overlap in Study 1 
(i.e., anger vs. happiness), but non-significant difference in Study 2 (i.e., sadness vs. 
contentment).  The same tests were then applied to helping; there was no main effect of arousal, 
F<1, suggesting that high (M = 5.16) versus low arousal (M = 5.42) emotion conditions did not 
report significantly different levels of helping. There was also no significant 2 arousal (high vs. 
low) X 2 valence (negative vs. positive) interaction on helping, F<1, (Mangry = 4.74, Msad = 4.96, 
Mhappy = 5.57, Mcontent = 5.88). 
 
6  To test whether participants in the angry condition are simply judging the close other in less 
positive terms, relative to the other conditions, Studies 1, 3, and 4 were merged to test the 
condition effect on self-ratings and other-ratings. Self-ratings were calculated by taking the mean 
of all 15 trait ratings for the self. Other-ratings were calculated by taking the mean of all 15 trait 
ratings for the other. Because the measure only included positive traits, higher values on self- 
and other-ratings may signify that participants thought the positive traits were more characteristic 
of either themselves or of their partner, respectively. Because across the 3 studies (Studies 1, 3, 
and 4), only the angry and control condition overlap, the condition variable was dummy coded to 
reflect 1 = angry condition and 0 = control condition. Then two independent samples t-test were 
performed with condition (1 = angry, 0 = control) on self-rating and other-ratings separately. 
Results suggest that participants in the angry (M = 4.54) and control condition (M = 4.53) 
reported similar degree of endorsement of positive traits for themselves, t(258)= -.13, ns. 
Similarly, participants in the angry (M = 4.47) and control condition (M = 4.59) reported similar 
degree of endorsement of positive traits for the other person, t(258)= 1.16, ns. An alternative test  
involves splitting the data by condition, and testing the associations between post-manipulation 
SAM valence and self-ratings, and between post-manipulation SAM valence and other-ratings, 
both controlling for the effect of sample (i.e., study number). First, two dummy variables were 
created to represent the study covariates (Dummy1: Study 1 = 0, Study 3 = 0, Study 4 = 1; 
Dummy 2: Study 1 = 0, Study 3 = 1, Study 4 = 0). Then the data were split by condition, and 
self-ratings were regressed on SAM valence and both dummy variables representing sample.  
Among participants in the angry condition, the degree to which they felt happy after the 
manipulation did not predict how positively they rated themselves (b =.049, β = .11, t = 1.32, ns), 
or how positively they rated others (b =.001, β = .003, t = 0.03, ns), controlling for the specific 
sample. Among participants in the control condition, the degree to which they felt happy after 
the manipulation predicted greater endorsement of positive traits of themselves (b =.168, β = .31, 
t = 3.85, p<.001), and greater endorsement of positive traits of others (b =.172, β = .31, t = 3.71, 
p<.001), controlling for the specific sample. 
 
7 One potential limitation concerns low power given the smaller sample size after including the 
large number of covariates in the model (N=193). Exploratory tests were analyzed to address this 
concern. Specifically, model was analyzed without inclusion of any covariates to examine the 
effects of giving to various others on mortality risk (N=264). Findings suggest that giving 
support to friends, β=-0.70, p=.242, Odds ratio=0.50, C.I.[0.16-1.60], parents, β=-0.19, p=.747, 
Odds ratio=0.83, C.I.[0.27-2.58], siblings, β=-0.12, p=.856, Odds ratio=0.89, C.I.[0.24-3.31], or 







Table II.1  
Summary of appraisals related to the discrete emotions in Chapter II 
Emotion        Appraisals 
 
     Anger negative valence 
other-responsibility for event 
other person blocks goals or present obstacles  
other person is a threat to self-esteem  
goal failure 
individual control  
high certainty  
     Happiness positive valence 
moderate self agency  
moderate individual control  
pleasantness 
low anticipated effort 
high attentional activity  
high motive consistency  
high certainty 
     Sadness negative valence 
circumstantial agency 
low control 
goal failure  
irrevocable loss  
     Contentment positive valence 
human agency or circumstantial agency?  
motive consistency 
perceived individual control  









Table II.2  
 
Means, standard errors, and post-hoc comparisons for all dependent variables by condition in 
Studies 1 to 4 
 
Note: Superscript a denotes a significant mean difference with anger condition, superscript h 
denotes a significant mean difference with the happiness condition, superscript s denotes a 
significant mean difference with the sad condition, superscript c denotes a significant mean 
difference with the contentment condition, superscript g denotes a significant mean difference 
with the gratitude condition, and superscript n denotes a significant mean difference with the 
more neutral control condition. Superscript a, h, s, c, g, or n followed by † denotes a marginal 
significance of p < .10. 
 Condition 
 Anger Happiness Neutral 
Study 1 DVs M SE M SE M SE 
     Valence 4.40hn .26 6.91an† .15 6.22ah† .27 
     Anger 6.83hn .19 1.89 an† .22 2.78 ah† .44 
     Arousal 4.23 .33 4.37 .37 3.59 .31 
     Self-other overlap 5.30 hn .10 5.68a .10 5.84a .08 
     Helping 4.74h†n .33 5.57a† .19 5.78a .21 
 Sadness Contentment Neutral 
Study 2 DVs M SE M SE M SE 
     Valence 4.28cn .29 6.80s .22 6.19s .31 
     Sadness 5.80cn .32 3.16s .36 2.96s .40 
     Arousal 3.04 .31 3.44 .31 3.58 .36 
     Self-other overlap 5.46 .11 5.42 .12 5.56 .11 
     Helping 4.96c†n .37 5.88s† .22 5.92s .25 
 Anger Gratitude Neutral 
Study 3 DVs M SE M SE M SE 
     Valence 4.49gn .30 6.90a .20 6.38 a .18 
     Arousal 3.86 .31 4.24n .30 3.25g .25 
     Self-other overlap 5.41n .10 5.53 .08 5.71a .06 
     Helping 5.96 .17 5.98 .16 5.67 .18 
 Anger Gratitude Neutral 
Study 4 DVs M SE M SE M SE 
     Valence 3.70gn .26 6.95an .27 5.65ag .22 
     Arousal 5.06gn .32 3.64a .28 3.63a .29 
     Self-other overlap 5.40 .08 5.52 .09 5.61 .08 





Table III.1  
Zero-Order Correlations of Support Given and Received Variables in Study 5a  
  Support Given 
Support 
Received 
   1 2 3 4 5 
1. Child  .40** -.06**  .15** -.01  -.12** 
2. Parent  .12**   .28**  .21**     .05**  -.14** 
3. Sibling  .08**   .22**  .38**     .12**   .12** 
4. Other Relatives         -.03   .10**  .12**    .30** .02 
5. Friend  -.30** .02 .04*  -.07**    .38** 
 
Note. Support received-given correlations are reported on the diagonal, N=2545. Cross-people 
correlations within support given are reported above the diagonal, N=3518. Cross-people correlations 
within support received are reported below the diagonal, N=2577 for support received.  





Table III.2  
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Model Used to Predict Mortality Risk among Participants with Children in Study 5a 
   Descriptives Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
 M (SD) or 
% 
β p Odds 
ratio 
β p Odds 
ratio 
β p Odds 
ratio 
β p Odds 
ratio 
β p Odds 
ratio 
Support Given                 
    Children  0.53 (0.37) -0.59 .004 0.55 -0.69 .002 0.50 -0.64 .006 0.53 -0.61 .009 0.55 -0.56 .017 0.57 
    Parents  0.36 (0.36) -0.24 .251 0.78 -0.29 .198 0.75 -0.19 .414 0.83 -0.13 .565 0.88 -0.14 .552 0.87 
    Sibling  0.12 (0.24) 0.09 .763 1.10 0.17 .599 1.19 0.24 .475 1.27 0.21 .532 1.23 0.22 .508 1.25 
    Other Relatives  0.10 (0.23) 0.10 .744 1.11 0.17 .607 1.18 0.14 .658 1.16 0.22 .502 1.25 0.25 .465 1.28 
    Friends  0.42 (0.37) -0.08 .685 0.92 -0.02 .919 0.98 0.01 .958 1.01 0.01 .954 1.01 0.02 .934 1.02 
Support Received                 
    Children  0.48 (0.44)    0.14 .465 1.15 0.17 .376 1.19 0.15 .461 1.16 0.14 .499 1.15 
    Parents  0.16 (0.32)    0.15 .536 1.16 0.10 .683 1.10 0.12 .629 1.13 0.11 .649 1.12 
    Siblings  0.15 (0.31)    -0.18 .492 0.83 -0.18 .498 0.83 -0.16 .571 0.86 -0.18 .523 0.84 
    Other Relatives  0.08 (0.24)    -0.27 .416 0.76 -0.32 .345 0.73 -0.45 .197 0.64 -0.45 .203 0.64 
    Friends  0.52 (0.43)    -0.12 .518 0.88 -0.08 .674 0.92 -0.08 .690 0.92 -0.09 .648 0.91 
Demographics                 
    Age  53.21 (0.62) / 
69.13(0.49) 
      
0.07 .621 1.08 0.08 .589 1.08 0.10 .521 1.10 
    Gender  52.9%♀ / 47.1%♂       0.41 .010 1.51 0.33 .050 1.39 0.38 .027 1.46 
    Marital status  85.8%M / 
14.2%NM 
      
-0.31 .116 0.73 -0.29 .149 0.75 -0.32 .118 0.73 
    Number of Children 3.23 (1.46)       0.05 .362 1.05 0.05 .358 1.05 0.04 .458 1.04 
    Religious attendance  4.73 (2.83)       -0.03 .242 0.97 -0.01 .585 0.99 -0.02 .495 0.98 
Socioeconomic status                 
    Education  13.63 (2.28)       -0.04 .317 0.97 0.002 .954 1.00 0.01 .888 1.01 
    Net worth  $215,146.61 
(271,837.06) 
      
-0.38 .088 0.68 -0.20 .376 0.81 -0.16 .489 0.85 
    Employment status  85.2%E / 14.8%UE       -0.72 <.001 0.49 -0.53 .006 0.59 -0.52 .008 0.59 
Physical Health                 
    Number of illnesses  1.03 (1.26)          0.06 .290 1.06 0.07 .221 1.07 
    Self-rated health  4.16 (0.68)          -0.57 <.001 0.56 -0.58 <.001 0.56 
    Functional status  82.7%NL / 16.6%L 
/ 0.7%UK 
         






Risk Factors                 
    Smoking  36.8%NS / 44.6%S 
/ 18.6%UK 
         
0.45 .006 1.56 0.46 .005 1.59 
    BMI  26.69 (4.42)          0.002 .896 1.00 -0.004 .826 1.00 
Mental Health                 
    Depressive symptoms 16.57 (15.74)          0.002 .774 1.00 0.003 .639 1.00 
    Well-being 198.67(29.06)          0.003 .384 1.00 0.004 .323 1.00 
Personality                 
    Extraversion 22.86 (5.59)             -0.01 .741 0.99 
    Agreeableness 28.20 (4.77)             0.04 .045 1.04 
    Conscientiousness 28.83 (4.53)             -0.04 .029 0.96 
    Neuroticism 15.78 (5.08)              -0.02 .369 0.98 
    Openness 21.56 (5.18)             -0.01 .392 0.99 
N=2352. P-values<.10 are bolded for clarity.  
 
Note: ♀ = Female; ♂ = Male; M = Married; NM = Not Married; E = Employed; UE = Unemployed; L = Limited Functional Status; 







Table III.3  
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Model Used to Predict Mortality Risk among Childless Participants in Study 5b 
   Descriptives Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
 M (SD) or 
% 
β p Odds 
ratio 
β p Odds 
ratio 
β p Odds 
ratio 
β p Odds 
ratio 
β p Odds 
ratio 
Support Given                 
    Parents  0.51 (0.40) -0.56 .384 0.57 -0.57 .425 0.57 -0.49 .517 0.61 -0.59 .456 0.55 -0.88 .305 0.42 
    Sibling  0.22 (0.31) -0.01 .983 0.99 -0.03 .965 0.97 0.18 .827 1.19 0.005 .996 1.00 0.12 .904 1.13 
    Other Relatives  0.13 (0.25) -1.30 .240 0.27 -1.15 .338 0.32 -1.18 .350 0.31 -1.39 .340 0.25 -1.09 .454 0.34 
    Friends  0.56 (0.38) -1.28 .059 0.28 -0.95 .216 0.39 -0.83 .318 0.44 -0.88 .312 0.41 -0.94 .345 0.39 
Support Received                 
    Parents  0.21 (0.35)    0.35 .607 1.42 0.38 .605 1.47 0.48 .537 1.61 0.97 .270 2.65 
    Siblings  0.29 (0.40)    0.11 .867 1.11 0.37 .600 1.45 0.40 .600 1.49 0.26 .753 1.30 
    Other Relatives  0.10 (0.25)    -0.59 .629 0.55 -0.43 .740 0.65 -0.46 .741 0.63 0.20 .898 1.22 
    Friends  0.66 (0.42)    -0.45 .502 0.64 -0.22 .760 0.80 -0.22 .771 0.80 0.11 .896 1.11 
Demographics                 
    Age  53.18 (0.66) / 
69.09 (0.50) 
      
0.52 .202 1.69 0.59 .180 1.80 0.80 .106 2.23 
    Gender  57.3%♀ / 42.7%♂       0.40 .430 1.49 0.15 .777 1.17 0.40 .513 1.49 
    Marital status  38.7%M / 61.3%NM       -0.79 .196 0.46 -0.72 .262 0.49 -0.54 .436 0.58 
    Religious attendance  4.24 (3.24)       0.001 .989 1.00 0.03 .663 1.03 0.02 .779 1.02 
Socioeconomic status                 
    Education  14.54 (2.54)       -0.05 .569 0.95 -0.01 .927 0.99 -0.10 .457 0.90 
    Net worth  $217,194.61 
($284,698.01) 
      
-0.79 .245 0.45 -0.52 .474 0.59 -0.93 .243 0.40 
    Employment status  86.9%E / 13.1%UE       0.62 .454 1.86 0.63 .474 1.88 0.32 .730 1.38 
Physical Health                 
    Number of illnesses  0.98 (1.15)          0.18 .426 1.19 0.05 .834 1.05 
    Self-rated health  4.17 (0.66)          -0.16 .715 0.85 -0.33 .471 0.72 
    Functional status  80.6% NL / 19.4%L          0.38 .547 1.46 0.67 .354 1.95 
Risk Factors                 
    Smoking  41.6%NS / 40.7%S / 
17.7% UK 
         
0.67 .202 1.96 1.19 .055 3.30 
    BMI  26.13 (4.55)          0.04 .426 1.04 0.07 .214 1.07 
Mental Health                 
    Depressive symptoms 16.42 (14.55)          0.003 .883 1.00 0.01 .779 1.01 





Personality                 
    Extraversion 21.15 (6.01)             0.06 .363 1.06 
    Agreeableness 27.38 (5.04)             -0.05 .459 0.95 
    Conscientiousness 28.82 (5.17)             0.27 .007 1.31 
    Neuroticism 16.39 (4.95)             -0.03 .657 0.97 
    Openness 22.19 (5.07)             0.11 .189 1.11 
N=193. P-values<.10 are bolded for clarity.  
 
Note: ♀ = Female; ♂ = Male; M = Married; NM = Not Married; E = Employed; UE = Unemployed; L = Limited Functional Status; 


































  b = .55, t = 1.53, ns 
(b = .83, t = 2.33, p < .05) 
  b = .64, t = 1.69, p = .095 
(b = 1.03, t = 2.86, p < .01) 
b = .38, t = 2.86, p < .01 
b = .54, t = 3.96, p < .001 






Experimental Manipulations in Study 1 to 4 
 
Participants were asked to recall a particular emotion (i.e., Study 1: anger, happiness, control; 
Study 2: sadness, contentment, control; Study 3: anger, gratitude, control; Study 4: anger, 
gratitude, control). Then they asked to reflect on the causes and reasons underlying their 
emotional experience for 30 seconds. 
 
 
Manipulation for Anger Condition (Study 1) 
 
We would now like you to think about a time from your past in which you felt angry at a close 
friend. 
  
Although people experience a variety of positive and negative experiences in their life, there are 
times when they experience extreme anger at another person – times in which they are 
overwhelmed with anger and negativity. 
  
Take a few moments RIGHT NOW to think about times from your past with a close friend that 
make you feel angry when you think about that person RIGHT NOW. 
  
As you do this, try to identify a specific experience with a close friend from your past that makes 
you feel overwhelmed with anger when you think about it now. Although it may be difficult, 
most people can usually remember at least one event. Take your time as you try to do this. 
 
Press the next button when you are ready to continue. 
 
 
Manipulation for Happiness Condition (Study 1) 
 
We would now like you to think about a time from your past in which you felt happy with a 
close friend. 
Although people experience a variety of positive and negative experiences in their life, there are 
times when they experience extreme happiness with another person – times in which they are 
overwhelmed with joy and positivity.  
Take a few moments RIGHT NOW to think about times from your past with a close friend that 
make you feel happy when you think about that person RIGHT NOW. 
 
As you do this, try to identify a specific experience with a close friend from your past that makes 
you feel overwhelmed with happiness when you think about it now. Although it may be difficult, 
most people can usually remember at least one event. Take your time as you try to do this. 
 







Manipulation for Sadness Condition (Study 2) 
 
We would now like you to think about a time from your past in which you felt sad or depressed 
because of an experience you shared with a close friend. 
 
Although people experience a variety of positive and negative experiences in their life, there are 
times when they become extremely sad in response to the actions of other people – times in 
which they are overwhelmed with sadness and negativity. They may have felt sad from being 
rejected by a friend, or feel depressed about something their friend has said or done. 
 
Take a few moments RIGHT NOW to think about times from your past with a close friend that 
make you feel sad when you think about them RIGHT NOW. 
 
As you do this, try to identify a specific experience with a close friend that makes you feel 
overwhelmed with sadness when you think about it now. Although it may be difficult, most 
people can usually remember at least one event. Take your time as you try to do this. 
 




Manipulation for Contentment Condition (Study 2)  
 
We would now like you to think about a time from your past in which you felt content or 
satisfied because of an experience you shared with a close friend. 
 
Although people experience a variety of positive and negative experiences in their life, there are 
times when they experience extreme contentment with other people – times in which they are 
overwhelmed with satisfaction and positivity. They may enjoy spending a sunny afternoon 
outside with a friend after a long winter semester, or sharing a delicious and satisfying treat with 
a friend. 
 
Take a few moments RIGHT NOW to think about times from your past with a close friend that 
make you feel content when you think about them RIGHT NOW.  
 
As you do this, try to identify a specific experience with a close friend that makes you feel 
overwhelmed with contentment when you think about it now. Although it may be difficult, most 
people can usually remember at least one event. Take your time as you try to do this. 
 







Manipulation for Control Condition (Study 1 and 2) 
 
We would now like you to think about a time from your past in which you completed a daily 
activity with a close friend. 
 
Although people experience a variety of positive and negative experiences in their life, there are 
times when they don’t feel any particular emotions at all with another person – times in which 
they are simply going about their daily activities, such as shopping for groceries, doing laundry 
or dishes, or studying in the library. 
 
Take a few moments RIGHT NOW to think about times from your past with a close friend when 
you completed daily activities with that person.  
 
As you do this, try to identify a specific experience with a close friend from your past that does 
not make you feel particularly positive or negative when you think about it now. Although it may 
be difficult, most people can usually remember at least one event. Take your time as you try to 
do this. 
  




Manipulation for Anger Condition (Study 3) 
 
We would now like you to think about a time from your past in which you felt angry at [friend’s 
initials]. 
 
Although people experience a variety of positive and negative experiences in their life, there are 
times when they experience extreme anger at their close friend – times in which they are 
overwhelmed with anger and negativity. They may have felt angry because their friend treated 
them unfairly, or because their friend did or said something mean or inconsiderate. 
 
Take a few moments RIGHT NOW to think about times from your past with [friend’s initials] 
that make you feel angry when you think about this person RIGHT NOW. 
 
As you do this, try to identify a specific experience with your friend from your past that makes 
you feel overwhelmed with anger when you think about it now. Although it may be difficult, 
most people can usually remember at least one event. Take your time as you try to do this. 
 







Manipulation for Gratitude Condition (Study 3) 
We would now like you to think about a time from your past in which you felt grateful because 
of [friend’s initials]. 
 
Although people experience a variety of positive and negative experiences in their life, there are 
times when they experience extreme gratitude toward their close friend – times in which they are 
overwhelmed with gratitude and positivity. They may have felt grateful because their friend 
helped them with something important, or because their friend supported them during a time of 
need. 
 
Take a few moments RIGHT NOW to think about times from your past with [friend’s initials] 
that make you feel grateful when you think about this person RIGHT NOW. 
 
As you do this, try to identify a specific experience with your friend from your past that makes 
you feel overwhelmed with gratitude when you think about it now. Although it may be difficult, 
most people can usually remember at least one event. Take your time as you try to do this. 
 




Manipulation for Control Condition (Study 3) 
We would now like you to think about a time from your past in which you completed a daily 
activity with [friend’s initials]. 
 
Although people experience a variety of positive and negative experiences in their life, there are 
times when they don’t feel any particular emotions at all with their close friend – times in which 
they are simply going about their daily activities with their friend, such as walking or driving 
somewhere, waiting in line, or watching TV to just pass some time. 
 
Take a few moments RIGHT NOW to think about times from your past with [friend’s initials] 
when you completed daily activities with this person.  
 
As you do this, try to identify a specific experience with your friend from your past that makes 
you feel neutral when you think about it now. Although it may be difficult, most people can 
usually remember at least one event. Take your time as you try to do this. 
 








Manipulation for Anger Condition (Study 4) 
 
We would now like you to think about a time from your past in which you felt angry at this 
person. 
 
Although people experience a variety of positive and negative experiences in their life, there are 
times when they experience extreme anger at their partner – times in which they are 
overwhelmed with anger and negativity. They may have felt angry because their partner treated 
them unfairly, or because their partner did or said something mean or inconsiderate. 
 
Take a few moments RIGHT NOW to think about times from your past with your partner that 
make you feel angry when you think about that person RIGHT NOW. 
 
As you do this, try to identify a specific experience with your partner from your past that makes 
you feel overwhelmed with anger when you think about it now. Although it may be difficult, 
most people can usually remember at least one event. Take your time as you try to do this. 
 




Manipulation for Gratitude Condition (Study 4) 
 
We would now like you to think about a time from your past in which you felt grateful because 
of this person.  
 
Although people experience a variety of positive and negative experiences in their life, there are 
times when they experience extreme gratitude toward their partner – times in which they are 
overwhelmed with gratitude and positivity. They may have felt grateful because their partner 
helped them with something important, or because their partner supported them during a time of 
need.    
 
Take a few moments RIGHT NOW to think about times from your past with your partner that 
make you feel grateful when you think about that person RIGHT NOW.  
 
As you do this, try to identify a specific experience with your partner from your past that makes 
you feel overwhelmed with gratitude when you think about it now. Although it may be difficult, 
most people can usually remember at least one event. Take your time as you try to do this. 
 







Manipulation for Control Condition (Study 4) 
 
We would now like you to think about a time from your past in which you completed a daily 
activity with this person. 
 
Although people experience a variety of positive and negative experiences in their life, there are 
times when they don’t feel any particular emotions at all with their partner – times in which they 
are simply going about their daily activities with their partner, such as shopping for groceries, 
doing laundry or dishes, or cleaning the house. 
 
Take a few moments RIGHT NOW to think about times from your past with your partner when 
you completed daily activities with that person.  
 
As you do this, try to identify a specific experience with your partner from your past that makes 
you feel neutral when you think about it now. Although it may be difficult, most people can 
usually remember at least one event. Take your time as you try to do this. 
 




Reflection (occurs after emotion manipulation) 
 
Now that you have recalled a specific experience, spend a few moments right now focusing on 
the causes and reasons underlying the thoughts and feelings you experienced during that 
situation. Try to understand the emotions you experienced during that event. Take a few 
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